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Mr. Levy’s case should serve as a notice that the Justice Department
has made prosecution of Internet piracy one of its priorities . . . .
Those who engage in this activity, whether or not for profit, should
take heed that we will bring federal resources to bear to prosecute
these cases. This is theft, pure and simple.1
James K. Robinson,
Assistant Attorney General

INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the new millennium, time and space are no
2
longer obstacles to the flow of information and ideas. The Internet
3
revolution is changing the way we live, work, and entertain ourselves.

1. Ashbel S. Green, Net Piracy Law Gets First Conviction: UO Student, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 1999, at A1 (noting that the prosecution of Jeffrey Levy for
criminal infringement of software and other protected works was the first successful
prosecution under the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997).
2. See BRYAN ELLICKSON, GAUGING THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 1-3 (1991);
National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information
Age, at http://books.nap.edu/ html/digital_dillemma/exec_summ.html (last visited
May 22, 2000).
3. See DAN MABRY LACY, FROM GRUNTS TO GIGABYTES: COMMUNICATIONS AND
SOCIETY 152-56 (1996) (describing the “explosion” of information technologies in
the latter half of the twentieth century, including the advent of the “information
highway”); David Beckman & David Hirsch, We Log On, Therefore We Believe:
Philosophically Speaking, the Internet is Creating a New Reality, 86 A.B.A. J. 74 (2000)
(arguing that attorneys must be cognizant of the Internet because it is homogenizing
the way people view the world around them and speaking effectively to a jury
requires knowledge of this Internet-reality); Peter Magnusson, The Internet Revolution
History and Significance (Feb. 5, 1997), at http://www.sics.se/~psm/ar97/sld003.htm
(noting that “[t]he Internet represents a fundamental and extensive force of change
that will leave few areas of our lives unaffected”); National Research Council, The
Digital
Dilemma:
Intellectual
Property
in
the
Information
Age,
at
http://books.nap.edu/html/digital_dillemma/exec_summ.html (last visited May 22,
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At the same time, the Internet is also changing the way laws are
4
broken.
Internet-related technologies have recently become the focus of
5
criticism and mild paranoia. For many, the focal point of this fear is
the increasingly ugly battle centered on the distribution of
copyrighted music via the Internet using a digital format known as
6
“MP3.” Some critics argue that the monetary survival of artists is at
stake because of the e-assault on copyright law led by “file-sharing”
7
companies like Napster.com. Nevertheless, prosecutors have not yet
filed criminal charges against these particular, alleged enemies of
8
copyright.
Although lawsuits may put MP3-trading Web sites out of business,
the problem of file-trading will not end with Napster and its clones.
Napster, which relies on an index available on a central server, is a

2000); COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 2-5 (Colin Beardon & Diane Whitehouse eds., 1993).
4. See Laura Ann Forbes, Note, A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must Regulate
Internet-Related Criminal Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REV.
189, 192 (1999) (noting that the Internet has provided a “new instrumentality” for
criminals to commit old-fashioned crimes); Robert L. Ullmann & David L. Ferrera,
Crime on the Internet, 42 BOSTON B.J. 4, 4 (1998) (noting that Internet crimes have
grown in number along with the number of users and that the costs to businesses are
astoundingly high).
5. One group of outraged music fans created a web site in an effort to sabotage
Napster, explaining that its mission is to create “a monkey wrench in the machinery
of online piracy” and noting that “[p]erhaps [this time web anarchy is] taking a form
that shakes up your comfortable little online music shop.” See Cuckoo’s Egg Project
Home Page, at http://www.hand-2-mouth.com/cuckooegg (last visited July 13, 2000).
6. See Tatiana Boncompagni, After Napster: Controversy Over Music Downloads
Spurs Hill Lobbying Campaign, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 14, 2000, at 1
(noting that both Napster and the RIAA procured the services of lobbyists in
Washington in an effort to secure beneficial legislation); Patricia Jacobus, Napster Suit
Tests New Copyright Law, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-1679581.html
(Apr. 11, 2000) (noting that the RIAA suit against Napster would be a significant test
for application of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Major Recording Labels Sue
MP3Board on Copyright (June 23, 2000), at http://legalnews.findlaw.com/ legalnews/
s/20000623/n23147889.html (reporting that BMG Music, Sony Music
Entertainment, Inc., and Warner Brothers Records had filed a suit against
MP3Board, Inc. for facilitating piracy of copyrighted musical works); Andy Sullivan,
Online-Music Fight Comes to Capitol Hill (July 11, 2000), at http://dailynews.yahoo.
com/htx/nm/20000711/wr/tech_napster_dc_14.html (describing hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning Napster.com, Mp3.com and the state of
copyright infringement on the Internet); TVT Records Joins Stars, Labels Against Napster
at
(June
7,
2000),
http://legalnews.findlaw.com/legalnews/s/20000607/
technapster.html (noting that a major independent record label had filed suit
against Napster, Inc. for alleged copyright infringement).
7. See Adam Cohen et al., A Crisis of Content—It’s Not Just Pop Music; Every Industry
that Trades in Intellectual Property—from Publishing to Needlework Patterns—Could Get
Napsterized, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 68 (arguing that rampant file-trading threatens the
economic survival of creators of intellectual property generally).
8. Prosecutors have filed criminal charges for copyright infringement, but there
are no reported cases of prosecutions involving infringement accomplished by the
use of file-sharing technology.
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vulnerable target because it is susceptible to a legal attack that can
possibly shut down its server, which in turn, shuts down its entire
9
system. However, this weakness does not apply to “peer-to-peer”
10
(P2P) technology because P2P does not require a central server.
Therefore, in the peer-to-peer universe, there are no companies to
sue in the peer-to-peer universe, only individuals. Yet filing civil
lawsuits against millions of individual infringers would prove
ineffective at best given logistical considerations and the probability
11
that most infringers are probably judgment-proof.
One potential solution suggested by commentators is utilizing the
12
criminal provisions of the Copyright Act to thwart infringers. The
severity of the criminal penalties for copyright infringement, it is
13
argued, may provide an effective deterrent. Prosecuting a select few
infringers to set an “example” may discourage other potential
14
infringers.
Criminal liability for copyright infringement can be
distinguished from civil liability in two ways: (1) a mens rea
requirement of willfulness; and (2) the requirement that the
15
infringement exceed a minimum value.
Neither of these
16
requirements poses a significant hurdle for prosecutors.
The United States has prosecuted only one notable case involving
factual circumstances to the Napster file-sharing controversy under
17
the criminal copyright infringement statute. In 1999, Jeffrey Levy, a

9. See John Borland, Napster-like Technology Takes Web Search to New Level (May 31,
2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1983259.htm (noting that the
“decentralized architecture [of Gnutella] means there is no company [or server]
against which to file the kind of copyright-infringement lawsuit now facing Napster, a
prospect that has worried record executives.”).
10. Id.
11. See Froma Harrop, Theft from the Lords of Barbarity, DENV. POST, June 26, 2000,
at B6 (noting that peer-to-peer sharing engenders judgement-proof defendants).
12. See Karen Bernstein, The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry’s New
Instrument in the Fight Against Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 325, 340-41 (2000)
(arguing for the use of criminal prosecution under Section 506 of the Copyright Act
as a means of deterring infringing activities online).
13. See Ronnie Heather Brandes et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 657, 680 (2000) (noting the penalties that the “basic offense” under Section 506
of the Copyright Act carries are a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment, and
any subsequent offense can garner up to ten years imprisonment).
14. In oral argument before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Senior Judge
Beezer raised the question of whether criminal prosecutions under 17 U.S.C. § 506
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) would set an example and function to “educate the public.”
See A & M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., No. 00-16401 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2000) (oral
argument).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
16. See infra Part II.C.2-3 (discussing the willful infringement requirement that is
necessary to trigger criminal liability for copyright infringement).
17. See Karen Eft, Oregon Student Convicted of Software and Music Piracy (Aug. 20,
1999), available at http://ist.berkeley.edu:5555/ News/Articles99/gen.piracy.html
(noting that University of Oregon student Jeffrey Levy was the first person convicted
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student at the University of Oregon, pled guilty to criminal copyright
infringement for his use of school computers to post software and
musical works on the Internet thereby making them available for
18
others to download. The “web-hosting” method utilized by Levy for
19
distributing these works differs technologically from the “filesharing” methods that are now at issue in A & M Records v. Napster,
20
Inc. It is important to note that the differences between file-sharing
21
and web-hosting are de minimis, for the purposes of legal liability.
However, identifying individual targets for prosecution will present
22
First, determining who is a criminal
considerable difficulties.
infringer in cyberspace, or even developing the probable cause
necessary to search for infringing material, may be impossible in most
23
cases. Second, even if prosecutors can successfully identify targets,
P2P technology, Fourth Amendment search and seizure
jurisprudence, and the copyright doctrine of “fair use” may combine
24
to prevent the successful criminal prosecution of most infringers.
This Comment explores potential pitfalls in the criminal
prosecution of individual “file-traders” for copyright infringement.
Part I of this Comment examines the factual and legal background of

under the NET Act, shattering the “dangerous misconception among some netizens
that the not-for-profit sharing of copyrighted works is cool, culturally speaking, and
affirms the distributors’ admirable technical prowess” without risk of sanction).
18. See UO Student Sentenced for Internet Piracy, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 24,
1999, at D9 [hereinafter UO Student] (noting that Levy received two years probation
for criminal infringement, but would have served a prison sentence if prosecutors’
could have proved the value of distributed works exceeded $10,000); Green, supra
note 1, at A1 (noting that the works Levy distributed included software, digitally
recorded movies, and musical recordings).
19. Levy hosted a Web site, known as a “warez site,” which users who downloaded
material from the site accessed via the World Wide Web. File-sharing software is not
confined to the Web, and utilizes a “peer-to-peer” paradigm that differs from the
traditional “client-server” paradigm of the Web. See Lee Gomes & Lisa Bransten,
Napster Fuels P2P Uproar (July 5, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/
news/ 0,4586,2598097,00. html (explaining the decentralized nature of P2P
technology).
20. No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
21. Copyright law is generally “technology neutral,” making an analysis of the
apparatus used for allegedly infringing activity irrelevant in most respects. For
example, Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which defines the test for “fair use” of
copyrighted material, makes no mention of the method used for copying in its fourpronged balancing test. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5 (1976) (noting that the
“form, manner, or medium” in which a work is fixed does not determine the subject
matter of copyright law).
22. Levy operated from a university system, on his own web site, which was easily
traceable. Infringers using P2P do not leave the same obvious trail of evidence,
presenting different challenges. See UO Student, supra note 18, at D9.
23. See infra Part II.C.1-4 (citing the technical and constitutional impediments to
successful prosecution).
24. See infra Part II.C.4-5 (exploring Fourth Amendment constraints and the
availability of the entrapment defense).
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recent litigation involving file-sharing software, including an
explanation of the technologies and a review of the parties involved
in current litigation. Part I also explores the evolution of the concept
of copyright infringement, including the criminalization of, and
defenses to, infringement. Part II argues that, even though filetrading is not an inherently infringing activity, individuals using P2P
systems can quickly and easily engage in infringing activity that
exceeds the criminal threshold. The unique attributes of P2P
technology and the Fourth Amendment, however, may prevent the
identification of most criminal infringers. Part III concludes that
although content producers may wish to push for more vigorous
prosecution of criminal copyright infringement, wide-scale
enforcement is impossible given current legal and technological
realities.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Fury Over MP3 “File-sharing”
1. Technology
25
The theft of intellectual property is not a recent phenomenon.
The Internet and other digital technologies are merely new potential
26
threats in the history of copyright infringement. These technologies
provide the means to accomplish criminal infringement by allowing
27
copying and distribution of works on a massive scale.
Understanding the legal debate requires knowledge of the
underlying technology. A brief explanation of the most important
components of the “file-sharing” system is therefore necessary.
MP3 is an acronym for Moving Picture Experts Group 1 Audio
28
Layer 3. MP3 refers to both the method for the compression of

25. Even though there were earlier copyright infringement cases, the first
significant copyright infringement case was decided in England in 1774. See
Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774) (discussing the origins of the rights
granted to copyright holders).
26. See Victoria Cundiff, Stop Cyber Theft: Respecting Intellectual Property Rights on the
Internet, 444 PLI/PAT 93, 95 (1996) (noting that the advent of cyberspace
dangerously has led some to believe that the intellectual property regime of realspace does not apply to the Internet); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2191 (2000)
(noting that “each new technology has produced cries of alarm over our ‘outdated’
copyright system”).
27. See Cundiff, supra note 26, at 95.
28. The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) is a subsection of the
International Organization for Standardization and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC). This group developed the current
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29

audio data and the resulting digital format. To the human ear, a
song recorded in MP3 format sounds as pure and crystalline as a song
30
recorded on a Compact Disc (CD). MP3, quite simply, makes the
31
transfer of CD quality musical content via the Internet possible.
Though MP3 does not include an integrated copying protection
system, there is at least one external encryption application that
32
claims to make MP3s secure. Although MP3 is in itself something of
a revolution, other technologies magnify its impact considerably,
particularly “file-sharing” software, which assists in the distribution of
33
digital data.
34
The Web-based company Napster.com uses this type of software.

technical standards for Video CDs, MP3s, DVDs, and Multimedia on the World Wide
Web. See Moving Picture Experts Group Homepage, at http://www.cselt.it/mpeg/ (last
visited Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter MPEG Homepage] (describing the nature and
functions of MPEG in the production of “an industry worth several tens of millions of
dollars”).
29. Files that at one time took hours to download, now take minutes, and, when
placed on hard drives, occupy only one megabyte of space per minute of music,
rather than hundreds of megabytes. This compression rate compares favorably with
compact discs, which require ten megabytes per minute. See National Research
Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/digital_dillemma/ch2.html (last visited May 22, 2000).
30. See Akansha Atroley, Napster: Music to Most Ears, COMPUTERS TODAY, Aug. 15,
2000, at 80 (explaining that even though the human hearing ranges from twenty
hertz and twenty kilohertz, MP3 technology eliminates all frequencies except those
to which the ear is most sensitive, in the area of two to four KHz); see also Mike
Tanner, MP3 Music Pirates Avoid Legal Action (May 23, 1997), at http://www.wired.
com/news/print/ 0,1294,4069,00.html (noting that MP3 “allows for music files . . .
that offer near CD-quality sound”).
31. See Jonathan Yardley, The Napster Generation, WASH. POST, May 8, 2000, at C2
(describing MP3s as “an audio file format ‘that has been compressed . . . without any
noticeable loss in sound quality . . . in a package small enough that it can be
downloaded and/or stored on your PC’”).
32. See Atroley, supra note 30, at 80 (describing the “Digibox” from InterTrust,
which utilizes encryption technology to secure MP3s, giving paying consumers a
“digital key” to access the encrypted MP3).
33. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “Internet was of little use for the
distribution of music” before the invention of the MP3 compression algorithm); Rob
Glaser, Time to Face the (Digital) Music, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at A25 (noting that
file-sharing software like Napster and digital music are “opening doors for
distribution models that had never before been seriously considered).
34. The press has vilified Napster as the leader in a vast conspiracy of copyright
pirates, while other commentators have touted the company as a trust-busting
alternative for artists faced with few choices in marketing and distribution outside the
“big record labels.” Compare At Last and At Length: Lars Speaks (May 26, 2000), at
http://slashdot.org/ nterviews/00/05/26/1251220.stml (explaining Metallica’s
position on Napster as a threat to artists’ rights in an interview with band member
Lars Ulrich), with Internet Music Debate Moves to Washington (May 24, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/05/24/mp3.napster.suit/html (noting that some
artists have supported Napster as an alternative form of distribution), and Chris
Nelson, Digital Nation: Musicians offer their Two Cents on Napster (June 7, 2000), at
http://www.sonicnet.com/news/archive/story.jhtml?id=971727 (citing one musician
as saying that recording labels are “in bed together” and “greedy” and that regulation
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In Napster’s P2P model, users connected to the Napster web site can
35
search the computers of other connected users for certain files. The
Napster web site serves as a hub connecting users who wish to trade
36
MP3 files; users log-on to the Napster system, which permits them to
locate the Internet addresses of other users, and search for files using
37
a method similar to standard search engines like “Yahoo!” Thus,
38
Napster allows virtual P2P transfers, connecting individual users
directly to one another. However, users must first connect to the
Napster server in order to find the desired file on the index
generated by the server’s search of currently connected users’
39
computers. Napster is currently configured to transfer only MP3
files, though it could be upgraded to transfer other files, including
40
image files.

was preferable to litigation). See also Bob Margolis, Chuck D Praises Napster at
Congressional Hearing (May 24, 2000), at http://www.sonicnet.com/news/archive/
story.jhtml?id=873083 (reporting that rapper Chuck D urged support for Napster as
an alternative for lesser-known artists and others trying to escape the control of the
“big four” record labels—Sony, BMG, Warner Brothers, and A & M Records).
35. See Napster Copyright Policy, at http://napster.com/dmca.html (last visited May
22, 2000) (explaining that Napster is an “integrated browser and communications
system” that allows users to “locate bands and music available in the MP3 music
format”).
36. See Karen Heyman, Pandora’s Box: Napster Unleashes Whole New Net Ballgame, at
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/00/19/cyber-heyman.shtml (last visited June 16,
2000) (“[T]he (Napster) software indexes the MP3s you’ve got on your hard drive,
then connects to the Napster server and makes your tracks available to anybody
who’s hooked up at the time—from your hard drive, not from the Napster server.”).
Napster (July 7, 2000), at
37. See Sean Portnoy, ZDNet Full Review:
http://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/pipreviews/0,8827,258242,00.html (noting
that Napster performs a search of a “library” composed of the hard drives of users
logged on the system at the time of the search).
38. In peer-to-peer configurations, individual computers are linked together
directly through the Internet without the assistance of a central server. See Gomes &
Bransten, supra note 19. The standard Internet configuration is the client-server
model, in which individuals (clients) link to others through a server which operates
much like a telephone switchboard. See id. (explaining P2P technology’s
decentralized character in contrast to older Internet search mechanisms like Yahoo!
and noting that Internet moguls have cited P2P technology’s potential as a
revolutionary technology); see also John G. Spooner, Intel: The Future is Peer (Aug. 24,
at
2000),
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2619470,00.html
(noting that computer chip manufacturing giant Intel Corp. has stated that it
believes the P2P model “will play a major role in the future of computing”). But see
Todd Spangler, The Napster Mirage (July 24, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/
intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2607261,00.html (noting that no current venture using
the P2P model is profitable and noting the lack of central control, as well as security
and privacy concerns as potential pitfalls).
39. See Heyman, supra note 36 (noting that the Napster model is a hybrid of P2P
and the traditional client-server paradigm).
40. See Greg Miller, Speed Counts with Napster, at http://live.altavista.com/scripts/
editorial.dll?efi=900&ci=1946462 (last visited July 7, 2000) (explaining the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of Napster, Gnutella and Imesh, and
finding Napster to be more user-friendly, while Gnutella offers true P2P sharing but
is slower and requires more technological sophistication of users, but allows the
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Napster is but one of a host of file-sharing platforms now in use.
Other platforms include Gnutella and Freenet that, unlike Napster,
42
are examples of “true” P2P software. These pure P2P systems do not
43
rely on central servers or a connection to a web site search engine.
Gnutella and Freenet are also among those platforms that allow users
to transfer files in formats other than MP3, including “JPEG” and
44
45
“MPEG” images, as well as digital video. This system allows users to
transfer text, images, and video, thereby increasing the comparative
46
utility of each system as am information distribution platform.
These systems will be discussed in greater detail in the discussion of
47
identifying criminal infringers below.
2.

Why prosecute, and who?
The debate over MP3s and file-trading is, at its core, about property
rights. Thus far, some legally recognized copyright owners are

transfer of other forms of data, including “Midi” and image files).
41. See id.; Wade Roush, Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet: Publishing in the PostCopyright Universe, at http://www.ebooknet.com/printerVersion.jsp?id=2536 (last
visited June 14, 2000) (discussing the impact of Freenet, Napster and Gnutella on
copyright law and the marketing strategies of content producers).
42. See id.
43. See Andy Oram, Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation, at
http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/208 (visited July 18, 2000) (describing the
technical aspects of Gnutella and Freenet and their relative superiority to Napster,
including Gnutella’s flexibility in allowing each site in the network of connected
users to “contribute to a distributed search in the most sophisticated way it can” by
enabling each site to interpret a search string independently).
44. See MPEG Homepage, supra note 28 (explaining that MPEG-1 is the standard
for Video CD); Welcome to JPEG, at http://www.jpeg.org/public/jpeghomepage.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2000) (explaining that JPEG is the acronym for Joint
Photographic Experts Group, also a working group of the ISO, which creates
standards for the compression of still images).
45. Digital video is familiar to anyone who owns a DVD player. While most DVDs
contain video originally shot on standard film and later converted into digital format,
filmmakers are beginning to use digital equipment to shoot original footage. See
Jason Silverman, Learning to Love Digital Video (Jan. 20, 2001), at http://www.wired.
com/news/culture/0,1284,40681,00.html; Mark Armstrong, Hollywood Versus Video
Napsters (May 30, 2000), at http://www.eonline.com/ News/Items/0,1,6553,00.html
(noting that the film industry is concerned by the potential threat of Gnutella,
Freenet and iMesh.com in aiding video piracy on the Internet); Studios Sue Website
Over Movie, TV Piracy (June 15, 2000), at http://legalnews.findlaw.com/legalnews/s/
20000615/leisurempaa.html (reporting that the Motion Picture Association of
America had filed a copyright infringement suit against IcraveTV.com for allegedly
distributing copyright protected video via the Web).
46. See Boncompagni, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that Gnutella’s capability to
transfer multiple file types has drawn the attention of the software industry);
Gwendolyn Mariano, Net Film Firm Taps Gnutella for Video Sales (June 14, 2000), at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-2080146.html (reporting that Gnutella
already has been selected as the vehicle for an online video venture by
SightSound.com in conjunction with a Microsoft copyright protection system despite
fears of piracy and litigation).
47. See infra Part II.C.1.
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48

attempting to defend this property in the civil arena. The media has
painted the current litigation as a simple battle between two
49
diametrically-opposed foes, namely “the music industry” and
Napster. Generally, by attempting to shut down Napster and similar
companies, the plaintiffs believe that they can prevent the widespread
unauthorized dissemination of their works, effectively protecting
50
their property interests.
51
As noted in the preceding section, the plaintiffs’ strategy is not a
complete solution to this dilemma. Napster is not the only platform
52
for file-trading. True P2P options like Freenet and Gnutella are not
susceptible to suit. Furthermore, suing corporate entities is less
effective. Therefore, defending intellectual property requires a more
direct approach, such as the prosecution of the individuals who use
P2P technology for infringing purposes. As in other criminal cases, a
criminal infringement prosecution will involve three parties:
defendants, prosecution, and “victims.”
a.

Potential defendants

Individual downloaders are the most likely targets for prosecution
because they are most directly responsible for the allegedly infringing
53
activity. Users are a diverse group. Users of file-trading software

48. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 12, 2000).
49. See Sullivan, supra note 6 (describing the MP3 debate as a “fight” between
“music-industry heavyweights and Internet moguls”); Fred Vogelstein, Is it Sharing or
Stealing?: Entertainment Moguls May Not Be Able to Stop Napster and Gnutella (June 12,
2000), at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/000612/share.htm (noting that
content producers have alleged that Napster and Gnutella creators are “part of a
rogue computer network determined to bring down the entertainment industry);
Teresa Wiltz, Man vs. Music Machine, WASH. POST, June 13, 2000, at C1 (recounting
one musician’s portrayal of Napster as “salvation” from the “music establishment . . .
that has enslaved us”);
50. See Doug Bedell, Napster Vows Fight After Ruling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
13, 2001, at A1 (quoting RIAA attorney Chuck Cooper as saying that the United
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s ruling against Napster means that “it’s
days as an instrument for electronic shoplifting are over”).
51. See supra Part I.A.1.
52. See Bedell, supra note 50, at A1 (noting that competitors, including Gnutella,
exist).
53. Students, much maligned as a “criminal class” of copyright bandits, form a
minority of users, estimated at only 37%. See Brad King, New School of Thought on
Piracy (June 9, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36875,00.html
(noting a survey that showed over 58% of Internet users who downloaded “free”
music were over thirty years old); Jonathan Cohen, ed., Study: Canadian Napster Users
Buy CDs (July 12, 2000), at http//www.billboard.com/daily/2000/0712_o5.asp
(citing statistics from a Solutions Research Group report that found 39% of
Canadian music downloaders were over twenty-five, and an additional 32% were
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four). Several surveys suggest that the
majority of American users are in the “over thirty” demographic. See id. (noting that
over 52% of users were older than thirty); 13 Million Americans Downloading Music for
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have many and varying motives for their activities, from gaining free
54
55
access to pornography and music, to sharing Genome discoveries.
56
File-trading services (“FTSs”), including Napster.com, MP3.com,
57
and iMesh.com are also potential targets. The FTSs provide services
that, in one form or another, help users to find MP3 files offered by
other users for exchange, generally in the hope of turning this service
58
into a profitable enterprise. One service model involves the storage
of music, previously purchased by users in CD format, on their web
59
site, which could then be accessed by users via the Internet. FTSs
hope to profit from the sale and distribution of music in the MP3

Free (June 9, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2045621.html (citing
a Pew Internet Project survey that found 42% of those downloading music via the
Internet without paying were between the ages of thirty and forty-nine).
54. See Gnutella FAQ Page, at http://gnutella.wego.com/go/wego.pages.page?
groupId=116705&view=page&pageId=118401&folderId=118398&panelId=119597&a
ction=view (last visited Aug. 21, 2000) (admitting that a large quantity of
“objectionable material,” including pornography, is traded using the Gnutella
software).
55. See Kristen Philipkoski, Gene Research, Meet Napster (Apr. 5, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0%2C1282%2C35404%2C00.html (noting
that one human genome researcher was exploring ways to use Napster-like
technology to allow scientists to share their research data).
56. Some of the legal literature on this subject has referred to Napster and its
progeny as Internet service providers (ISPs) or online service providers (OSPs).
However, to apply these terms in a technical legal sense may be presumptuous.
Historically, the term ISP applies to services that provide a connection to the
Internet, such as America Online, Inc. (AOL) or Starpower, Inc. One of the pivotal
questions in the Napster litigation is whether Napster qualifies as a “service provider”
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 512, thus qualifying for safe harbor protection.
Section 512(d) indicates that service providers that offer “location tools” are to be
afforded safe harbor. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. V 1999). Whether this applies to
companies that merely offer a location device, like Yahoo.com, or whether it applies
only to companies that offer Internet connections as well as location devices, like
AOL, is probably a matter of debate. For purposes of clarity, this Comment shall
refer to “file-sharing” services like Napster as file-trading services (FTSs). See Jennifer
E. Markiewicz, Note, Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 423, 436 (1999) (opining that the key factor in the ISP definition is
“facilitation of access to the Internet”).
57. IMesh is an FTS that touts itself as the platform for “sharing the world.”
IMesh is similar to other FTS’s in that it offers an application which enables users to
search the hard drives of other iMesh users. See iMesh.com: Using iMesh, at
http//www.imesh.com/using.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
58. See Christopher Jones, Open-Source “Napster” Shut Down (Mar. 15, 2000), at
http: // www. wired. com / news / technology / 0%2C1282%2C34978%2C00 . html
(describing the way in which Gnutella, Freenet, and Napster allow users to connect
to one another on the net, the former without a central server, and also describing
America Online’s cancellation of the official project for fear of copyright
infringement liability).
59. See Derek Caney, MP3.com Settles Copyright Suit with 2 Labels (June 9, 2000),
available at http://washingtonpost.com/cgibin/gx.cg. . .me=wpni/print&articleid=
A28629-2000Jun9 (describing the MyMP3.com service which allowed subscribers to
listen to music via the Internet after having the service provider scan the CD in order
to verify that the subscriber owned an authorized copy of the work, and noting that
MP3.com had claimed that this service constituted “fair use” as mere space-shifting).
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format; this goal puts them squarely in competition with the RIAA.
Since they are already open to attack in civil proceedings, and it is
61
uncertain whether there is any potential criminal liability for FTSs,
they are less likely to be targeted by prosecutors.
Perhaps the most misunderstood of the players in this drama are
the file-sharing software designers who create free file-trading
62
software. The motives of the designers are as diverse as the number
63
For example, Gene Kan, one of the
of software applications.
developers of Gnutella, stated that the goal of the creators of
64
Gnutella was technological advancement, not profiteering or piracy.
Freenet creator Ian Clark proclaimed that the impetus behind its
creation was concern for freedom of speech, noting that “Freenet
65
[was] designed to make censorship impossible.”
b.

Prosecutors

It is likely that the U.S. Department of Justice will, in most
66
instances, file the actual charges and prosecute the cases. Local U.S.

60. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Mission Statement, at
http://www.riaa.org/About-Who.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter RIAA
Mission Statement] (stating that the RIAA is a trade organization whose “members
create, manufacture and/or distribute approximately 90% of all legitimate sound
recordings produced and sold in the United States”).
61. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
62. See Richard Stallman, Why Free Software is Better than Open Source, at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html (last modified Dec.
14, 2000) (describing the open-source movement, which calls for transparency or
non-encryption of software codes, and the relationship between “open-source
software” and “free software”).
63. Ian Clarke has stated that he created Freenet expressly for political purposes,
including ending government censorship, while Gnutella has been developed as an
alternative to older and slower methods for combing the Web for information. See
Heidi Chambers, Interview with Nathan Moinvaziri of Gnutella (July 8, 2000), at
http://www.dmusic.com/news/news.php?id=2745 (noting that Gnutella has made
file-sharing easier but quoting Gnutella web-master Moinvaziri as saying that
protecting anonymity was not an issue for Gnutella developers); Leander Kahney,
Alternative
Net
Protects
Pirates
(Mar.
8,
2000),
at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0%2C1282%2C34768%2C00.
html
(quoting Ian Clarke as stating that his “primary motivation [in creating Freenet] was
to make it very difficult to censor information”).
64. See Kurt Nimmo, Interview with Gnutella’s Gene Kan (May 14, 2000), at
http://www.jamz.com/?id=417&action=print (explaining that Gnutella is primarily
designed as a tool for “real-time searching” that is an advancement over search
engines like Yahoo!).
65. See Ian Clarke, My Views on Censorship and Copyright, at
http://freenet.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=philosophy (last visited Apr. 10,
2001) (expressing the view that access to information is necessary for open and
democratic societies and questioning the value of copyright law in promoting and
rewarding creativity).
66. See Janet Reno, Statement by the Attorney General, Symposium of the Americas:
Protecting Intellectual Property in the Digital Age (Sept. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipsymposium.htm (noting the Justice Department’s
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Attorneys may try most cases, but the Justice Department, which has
also recently added a “Cybercrime” section, may provide additional
67
expertise for prosecution teams.
c.

Victims

While criminal prosecutions are generally carried out by agents of
68
the government in the legal system of the United States, victims and
groups representing their interests often play an important role in
69
urging prosecutors to take action.
The RIAA and its member
companies are at the forefront of the litigation of alleged MP3
70
copyright infringement and are also likely to push for increased
71
prosecution of criminal infringement cases in the future.
The RIAA primarily represents major record labels, such as A & M
Records and BMG, Inc., which controls the marketing and
72
distribution of artists’ recordings. Filing individual civil suits against

strong commitment to prosecuting cases and making sure that “serious IP criminals
go to jail for significant prison terms” and that they “get the message, and the
message must be clear: There is no safe place to hide.”).
67.
The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (“CCIPS”) attorney
staff consists of about two dozen lawyers who focus exclusively on the issues
raised by computer and intellectual property crime. Section attorneys advise
federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents; comment upon and
propose legislation; coordinate international efforts to combat computer
crime; litigate cases; and train all law enforcement groups.
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice, Homepage, at http://www.cybercrime.gov (last modified
Apr. 5, 2001).
68. But see Terry Carter, Cops in the Cross Fire, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 58
(reporting that a little-used Pennsylvania common law doctrine that allows private
citizens to press criminal charges has been utilized recently by civil rights advocates
in Philadelphia).
69. See Ahmed A. White, Victims’ Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal
Jurisprudence, 87 KY. L.J. 357, 358 (1999) (noting the success of the victims’ rights
movement in the United States, including the proposed constitutional amendment,
and claiming that it “threatens to pervert the critical thrust of rule of law by
undermining both its facility to bind the contemporary criminal justice system and its
jurisprudence to a minimum of rational norms, possibly shattering the construct’s
capacity to insure a minimally progressive, liberal legal system.” ).
70. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia, Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP,
2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., No. 00-CIV 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 524808, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2000).
71. The RIAA has a strong record of successfully promoting legislative action for
its cause, and there is no reason to believe that these efforts will not be duplicated if
criminal prosecution appears to be a realistic means. See Lewis Kurlantzick &
Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of
Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497, 499-500 (1998) (describing the
lobbying efforts of the industry and RIAA to form copyright legislation in the face of
opposition from the consumer electronics industry).
72. See RIAA Mission Statement, supra note 60 (stating that the RIAA is a trade
group representing members of the “recording industry” who “create, manufacture
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millions of file-traders is probably an impractical alternative at best,
thus it is in the interest of these corporations to see enough
individuals convicted in criminal cases to provide a deterrent to
73
others.
The musicians and other artists whose works are the object of filetrading also have a vital interest in the outcome of the MP3 debate.
Most of these artists earn their living from the performance and sale
74
of their works. Despite this common ground, artists, particularly
musicians, disagree as to whether file-sharing sites pose a threat to the
75
profitable pursuit of their profession. Although some artists feel
file-sharing represents a preferable alternative to the “slavery” of
76
working under the major record labels, others see it as “theft, pure
and simple,” threatening to destroy the entire music industry and

and/or distribute approximately 90% of all legitimate sound recordings produced
and sold in the United States”).
73. Although civil actions may raise public awareness, the threat of criminal
penalties may serve as a much more effective deterrent. See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal
Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 3 (1998)
(arguing that the evidence for the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions “is much
firmer than it was fifteen years ago”).
74. See Declaration of Steve Wendell Isaacs (July 26, 2000), at
http://www.napster.com/pressroom/legal.html (noting that musicians profit from
sales and performance of their music, but decrying the publishing process of the
major record labels).
75. See The Future of Digital Music: Is There an Upside to Downloading?, Hearings on
Copyright Issues and Digital Music on the Internet Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th
Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Future of Digital Music] (statement of Lars Ulrich,
drummer, Metallica) (opining that “if music is free for downloading, the music
industry is not viable” and that Napster and its users are guilty of common theft
regardless of the use of new technology to accomplish it). But see Derek Caney, Prince
Praises Napster, Rips Industry (Aug. 9, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/filters/
printerfriendly/0,6061,2613714-2,00.html (quoting music giant Prince, who
excoriated the RIAA, exclaiming that “[y]oung people . . . need to be educated
about how the record companies have exploited artists and abused their rights for so
long and about the fact that online distribution is turning into a new medium which
might enable artists to put an end to this exploitation”); Gary Graff, Napster
Controversy Splits Musicians, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 16, 2000, at G5 (citing Limp
Bizkit, Cypress Hill, and Green Day as bands showing support for Napster, in contrast
to Jimmy Buffett, Nikki Sixx of Motley Crue, and Bret Michaels of Poison as
concerned about the impact of MP3 trading); Jon Healey, Music Industry Facing
Challenge,
at
http://www.mercurycenter.com/cgibin/edtools/printpage/printpage.pl (last visited
May 30, 2000) (“A slew of lesser-known bands have released free songs in MP3 format
in the hope of building an audience.”); Robert Lemos, Hackers Making Napster
“Irrelevant”
at
(July
16,
2000),
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2604185-2,00.html
(stating
that platforms like Napster may afford smaller artists greater opportunity to market
their music without the need for recognition by the music label monopoly).
76. See Neil Strauss, A Chance to Break the Pop Stranglehold, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999,
at 1AR (describing rock artist Prince’s performance with the word “slave” written on
his cheek in protest of his treatment by the Warner Brothers record label and
subsequent use of the Internet to distribute his music independent of the label).
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77

their livelihoods.
Additionally, a curious assortment of miscellaneous interest groups
78
find that the Napster litigation provides a focal point for their cause.
Napster defenders chiefly consist of groups claiming to support
technological innovation, a robust First Amendment, and a
79
80
monopoly-free free market. The opponents of file-trading see it as
a pernicious threat to creators, potentially destroying the financial
incentives to creativity and thus stifling the “Progress of Science and
81
the useful Arts.”
The need to balance between protecting and fostering creative
interests, and allowing for the development of new technologies
82
provides a fundamental tension in copyright law.
How these

77. See Ann Powers, Rock Star vs. Rock Fan: Who Matters?, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2000, at 39AR (comparing Lars Ulrich’s reaction to Napster “piracy” to “a schoolboy
tattling on the kids who toilet-papered the gym”).
78. Though the exact number of groups having declared their positions on
Napster is not known, the variety of groups participating as amici curiae is telling.
The Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, the Eagle Forum Education and
Legal Defense Fund, the Digital Media Association, the Consumer Electronics
Association, and the Computer & Communications Industry Association have filed
briefs in support of or neutral to Napster, while content producers have generally
shown both formal and informal support for the RIAA. See Napster Legal Documents, at
http://www.napster.com/pressroom/legal.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2001) (listing
several amici curiae briefs in support or neutral to Napster and providing access to
those briefs).
79. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Physicians & Surgeons,
Inc. & Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund, at 4, A & M Records v.
Napster, No. 00-16401, No. 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000)
(“First Amendment rights do not lose their protections simply because someone
else’s interests are harmed, be it harm to a politician or harm to a profit-maximizing
corporation.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition, Commercial
Internet Exchange, Computer & Communications Industry Assoc., Information
Technology Assoc. of Am., NetCoalition.com, United States Internet Industry Assoc.,
and United States Telecommunications Assoc. at 2-3, A & M Records v. Napster, No.
00-16401, No. 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000); Brief of Amicus
Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal at 2-3, A & M Records v.
Napster, No. 00-16401, No. 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000)
(finding that a blanket ruling against Napster would have the dangerous effect of
impeding “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”).
80. See Music Industry, Music Publishers Respond to Napster, Reaffirming District Court’s
Infringement Findings, at http://www.riaa.com/PR_Story.cfm?id=320 (last visited Sept.
10, 2000) (noting that among those groups supporting the RIAA as amici curiae are:
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA); Software and Information Industry
Association (SIIA); American Film Marketers Association (AFMA); Association of
American Publishers (AAP); American Society of Media Photographers; Professional
Photographers Association; Graphic Artists Guild; Interactive Digital Software
Association (IDSA); American Society of Composers Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP); Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI); Producers Guild of America;
Directors Guild of America; Writers Guild of America, West; American Federation of
Musicians (AFM); Reed Elsevier; American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA); Office of the Commissioner of Baseball; National Basketball
Association (NBA); Screen Actors Guild (SAG); and Amsong).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (5th ed. 2000) (noting that
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interests should be balanced, and whether criminalization of an
increasingly common behavior should play a role in the resolution of
the file-sharing debate are difficult questions. If copyright defenders
eventually turn to the criminal law for solutions, the outcome will
largely depend on the regime of intellectual property law that is in
83
constant flux.
B. The Object of “Theft”: Copyright as Property, Infringement and Defenses
1.

What is being “stolen”?
Although one enraged musician testified to Congress that
copyright infringement was “theft,” the same as if someone
“[w]alk[ed] into a record store, grab[bed] what [they] want[ed] and
84
walk[ed] out,” this characterization is not entirely accurate.
Copyrights, unlike other objects of “theft,” are not tied to their
85
Indeed, if they were, file-traders would
physical manifestations.
almost never be liable, in civil or criminal actions, because they do
86
not “take” physical objects when they download MP3s. Conversely,
when a person walks out of a store with a CD in his pocket, he is
87
charged with theft, not copyright infringement.
Copyright owners possess, by virtue of their copyright, a “bundle of
88
rights,” which is defined by statute.
Copyright owner’s exclusive

“[c]opyright is an exceptionally dynamic body of law” and “is a form of legal
adaptation, a response to new technologies in the reproduction and distribution of
human expression”).
83. Id.
84. The Future of Digital Music, supra note 75 (statement of Lars Ulrich, drummer
of Metallica).
85. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 141 (noting that copyright “protection
extends not to the material object—e.g., the book, canvas, or cassette—per se, but
only to the original expression actually fixed in the object”).
86. See supra Part I.A.1 (assessing the practice of file sharing).
87. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-18 (1985) (distinguishing
copyright infringement and theft of “goods, wares [or] merchandise”).
88.
Subject to sections 107 through 12(2), the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.
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rights include the right of reproduction, distribution, and public
performance, including public performance by digital audio
89
transmission. Congress and the courts developed special rules that
govern the use, and delineate what constitutes misuse, of this special
90
form of property. When pursuing a criminal case, prosecutors must
employ theft’s analog in the intellectual property world; copyright
91
infringement.
Infringement can be characterized as the “theft” of one or more of
92
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. Thus, to “steal” an owner’s
copyright, an infringer need only, without authorization, reproduce
or distribute a copyrighted work in any form. Copyright is limited,
93
however, by certain statutory exceptions to this general rule. One of
these limitations, “fair use” is discussed in depth below.
2.

Criminal infringement before the rise of the internet
Since the inception of statutory copyright protection in the United
States, Congress consistently has expanded criminal liability and
94
stiffened penalties for copyright infringement. Prior to 1897, no
95
criminal penalties for copyright infringement existed.
In 1897,
96
however, Congress passed a bill that provided for criminal sanctions,

17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
89. See id.
90. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 324-26 (1997) (noting that the copyright regime governs the
copying of original works, the creation of “derivative works” and the distribution,
performance and display of works).
91. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217 (noting that although “copyright does not easily
equate with theft, conversion, or fraud,” the Copyright Act defines a distinct “term of
art to define one who misappropriates a copyright . . . infringe[ment]”).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. V 1999) (“Any person who infringes a
copyright . . . by the reproduction or distribution . . . of 1 or more copies or
phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works which have a retail value of more than
$1,000, shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18.”) (emphasis
added).
93. The Copyright Act provides a number of limitations to an author’s exclusive
rights, including “fair use,” and a number of compulsory licenses. See id. §§ 107-122.
94. See Mary Jane Saunders, Note, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright
Felony Act, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 673 (1994) (noting criminal liability for
infringement did not exist in the United States prior to 1897).
95.
The first criminal provision in our copyright laws was a misdemeanor penalty
added in 1897 for unlawful performances and representations of
copyrighted dramatic and musical compositions. In order to constitute a
criminal violation, the defendant’s conduct was required to have been
‘willful and for profit.’ Section 104 of the general copyright revision of 1909
extended this penalty to all types of copyrighted works, again if the conduct
was done willfully and for profit.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-997, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3571.
96. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82.
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97

ending the era of purely civil liability. At the heart of the 1897 Act,
and until recently all subsequent criminal infringement statutes, were
the dual requirements that the infringement be “for profit” and a
98
mens rea equal to “willfulness.”
For almost ninety years, these actus reus and mens rea requirements
did not change significantly, though the associated penalties
99
increased drastically. After Congress passed a series of legislation in
100
the 1980s, however, prosecutors could charge first time offenders
with a felony for simply infringing “sound recording,” a violation
which could garner up to two years in prison and a fine of up to
101
$250,000.
If a defendant was found to have produced or
distributed over 1000 infringing copies, a court could sentence the
102
offender to up to five years in prison.
Section 506 of the Copyright Act of 1976 maintained profit motive
103
as an essential element to criminal infringement.
New
technologies, especially the Internet, and pressure from content
producing industries, including the software industry, moved
104
Congress to eliminate this requirement in the 1990s. The fear that
“hackers” might do untold damage “for kicks” pushed criminal
copyright infringement in the direction of becoming a strict liability
105
crime.
Currently, section 506 of the Copyright Act differentiates criminal
infringement liability from civil liability by either the presence of a
106
profit motive or a retail value of infringed works exceeding $1,000.
Section 501 of the Copyright Act defines the basic elements of

97. Id. (establishing criminal sanctions for illicit performance or representation
of dramatic and musical works).
98. For a general discussion of the history of criminal copyright liability, and the
mens rea requirement in particular, see Ting Ting Wu, Note, The New Criminal
Copyright Sanctions: A Toothless Tiger?, 39 IDEA 527 (1999) (arguing the “willfulness”
requirement of § 506 will preclude many prosecutions and convictions for criminal
infringement).
99. See Saunders, supra note 94, at 674 (noting that while “[c]riminal offenses
under the 1909 Copyright Act were punishable as misdemeanor,” by 1982 the 1976
Copyright Act had been amended to include felony provisions, including penalties of
up to five years imprisonment and $250,000 in fines).
100. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994)).
101. See id. (citing a “lack of comprehensiveness and consistency” in sentencing
and purporting to rationalize sentencing though creation of guidelines).
102. See id.
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
104. See Saunders, supra note 94, at 678-79 (describing the lobbying efforts of the
computer industry and the subsequent introduction of legislation by Senator Orrin
Hatch).
105. See id.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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107

As a result of the
infringement in both criminal and civil cases.
relative paucity of criminal infringement cases, courts have
108
interpreted the base offense of infringement mostly in civil cases.
Nonetheless, such civil precedent is equally binding in the criminal
109
context.
3.

Copyright Felony Act of 1992 and No Electronic Theft Act of 1997
With the advancements in copying technologies in the 1980s and
1990s, especially digital and Internet technologies, Congress further
110
stiffened criminal penalties for infringement regime.
The
111
Copyright Felony Act (Felony Act) of 1992 amended the criminal
sanctions for copyright infringement under 18 U.S.C. § 2319,
112
equalizing penalties regardless of the media used.
The Act also
increased sentences, allowing for imprisonment of first-time
offenders of up to five years for conviction on ten or more infringing
copies of copyrighted works, value to exceed $2,500, during a six
113
Second-time offenders can be sentenced to ten
month period.
114
years imprisonment.
Though the sentencing guidelines
recommended under the Felony Act seem to indicate a rather
draconian turn in the criminalization of infringement, Congress

107. See id. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 12[2] . . . or who imports
copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an
infringer of the copyright.”).
108. The number of reported criminal infringement cases found in a search of
Westlaw or LEXIS can be counted on one hand, but the number of civil copyright
infringement cases is in the thousands.
109. The criminal sanctions of section 506 are only applicable when infringement,
as defined by the civil provisions of section 501, exists. Thus, cases interpreting the
base infringement offense, which is civil in nature, have a direct bearing on criminal
proceedings. If a court finds that no civil infringement exists, there can be no
criminal infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
110. See Saunders, supra note 94, at 678 (explaining that Congress implemented
stiffer criminal penalties in order to combat the alleged loss of billions of dollars in
intellectual property by the software industry).
111. Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
112. Id.
113.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1) of title 17
—(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set
forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or
distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at
least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have
a total retail value of more than $2,500
18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
114. See id. § 2319(b)(2) (“Any person who commits an offense under [section
506(a)(1) of title 17] . . . (2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in
the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent
offense under paragraph (1).”).
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attempted to differentiate between “innocent infringers” and more
115
culpable offenders.
116
Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft (“NET”) Act as a
reaction to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts'
117
The so-called “LaMacchia
decision in United States v. LaMacchia.
Loophole” prevented the criminal prosecution of copyright
infringement where there was no “commercial motive” on the part of
118
the infringer.
The NET Act eliminated the need to prove
119
commercial motive, including felony-level liability, and eviscerated
the “lack of market share damage” defense for criminal infringement
120
cases.
The NET Act also redefined “financial gain” as “receipt, or
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of
121
Thus, section 506 of the Copyright Act
other infringing works.”
now reads disjunctively, allowing criminal charges in cases of
infringement for “financial gain, or reproduction or distribution” of
122
the requisite number of “phonorecords.”
The NET Act retained “willfulness” as the mens rea element of
123
Willfulness is defined as “voluntarily and
criminal infringement.

115. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-997, at 6 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569,
3574; see also Saunders, supra note 94, at 687-88 (opining that it is well settled that
willfulness under the Copyright Felony Act requires a “specific intent” on the part of
the defendant and does not include “accidental” violations).
116. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 506, 507; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320; 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
117. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994); see also 143 CONG. REC. E1527-01 (daily ed.
July 25, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble) (“The NET Act constitutes a legislative
response to the so-called LaMacchia case.”).
118. See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 540 (noting that the Senate sponsor of the
Felony Act had intentionally retained the requirement of profit motive for criminal
infringement).
119. See Copyright Piracy, and H.R. 2265, and the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, House Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong. 148 (1997) [hereinafter NET Act Hearing] (testimony of Cary H.
Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Recording Industry
Association of America).
120. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 845 (1999) (noting that under the NET Act “if a
person made a copy of a licensed program from her computer at work for her home
computer so that she could continue to work on a project while caring for an elderly
relative” it might be actionable as a felony).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
122. The Copyright Act defines “phonorecords” as “material objects in which
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
are fixed by any method now known or later developed,” and is thus applicable to
MP3s. See id.
123. See 143 CONG. REC. H9883-01 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble) (“[T]he Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, during its
markup of the NET Act, passed an amendment to ensure that the bill would not
modify liability for copyright infringement, including the standard of willfulness for
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124

intentionally violat[ing] a known legal duty,” and the Supreme
125
Thus, the
Court held that the willfulness standard is subjective.
accused’s state of mind or beliefs in a criminal infringement case are
usually relevant in determining whether an act was committed
126
willfully.
The legislative history of the NET Act, however, indicates a
potentially critical redefinition of willfulness. Lawmakers declared
that even though the NET Act requires “more than the mere
reproduction or distribution of copyrighted works in establishing
127
willfulness,”
“proof of the defendant’s state of mind is not
128
Thus, Congress explicitly attempted to eliminate
required.”
subjective “ignorance of the law” as a defense to criminal
129
infringement.
4.

Contributory and vicarious infringement
130
Courts recognize three distinct tiers of liability for infringement,


criminal infringement.”).
124. See United States v. Cheek, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (citing United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973)) (noting the defendant’s good faith belief that tax
laws were unconstitutional need not be found objectively reasonable before being
heard by a jury).
125.
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals’ requirement that a claimed
good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as
possibly negating the Government’s evidence purporting to show a
defendant’s awareness of the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury.
Characterizing a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms
the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from considering it.
It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance or
probative value with respect to willfulness; but it is not contrary to common
sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty based
on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury to
consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious
question under the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial provision.
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04.
126. See United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (D. Neb. 1991) (holding
that the beliefs of the defendant in regard to his conduct determines willfulness in a
criminal copyright infringement case).
127. 143 CONG. REC. H9883-01, H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble).
128. Id. (statement of Rep. Coble).
129. The legislative history of the NET Act appears to indicate that criminal
infringement is meant to be a strict liability crime. The stipulation that mere
evidence of reproduction and distribution is not enough to establish willfulness is
part of a larger concern that “third parties,” such as ISPs, be exempted from the
“volitional” acts of others. See id. (statement of Rep. Coble). But see Loren, supra note
120, at 887-90 (arguing forcefully that the willfulness standard should require that
the government “prove an intentional violation of a known legal duty”).
130. The Copyright Act is devoid of any mention of theories of secondary liability,
which have developed as a matter of common law since the inception of the 1909
Copyright Act. See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197 (1931)
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depending largely on the degree of participation in the infringing
activity. The simplest form of liability, generally involving active
131
participation on the part of the infringer, is direct liability. Direct
infringement results from the unauthorized exercise of one or more
132
of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. For example, persons who
obtain a work that is subject to copyright protection, copy that work
without permission, and transfer those copies to other persons, are
liable for “direct” infringement for unauthorized reproduction and
133
distribution.
Secondary liability concepts, including vicarious and
contributory liability, have been adopted in copyright
134
jurisprudence.
Courts developed a special test for vicarious liability in copyright
135
infringement cases. Both the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second
and the Ninth Circuits held that, when a defendant has the
opportunity to infringe and directly benefits financially from the
136
infringement, the defendant may be found vicariously liable.
The
137
defendant’s knowledge of the infringing act is irrelevant.
The
distinguishing element of vicarious liability is the defendant’s ability

(holding a hotel liable for contributory infringement under the 1909 Act in
providing patrons with a radio during the broadcast of infringing performances
(citing Charles Scribner’s Sons, Inc. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352, 355 (1908))); Kalem Co.
v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911) (finding that secondary liability for
copyright infringement was not unconstitutional and that supplying the means for
infringement and “invok[ing]” it were grounds for liability “on principles recognized
in every part of the law”).
131. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that direct liability requires that an infringer engage in
one of the activities reserved to copyright owners under 17 U.S.C. § 106).
132.
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 121 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in
violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the
author, as the case may be.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
133. Id.
134. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 783 (noting that the legislative history of
section 106 suggests the explicit creation of secondary liability for infringement).
135. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that “even in the absence of an employer-employee
relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities”).
136. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a flea market operator was liable for vendors’ sale of pirated records);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding that a retailer was vicariously liable for infringement from its lessee’s sale of
pirated records because it benefited from the infringement, even though the retailer
lacked knowledge of the infringement).
137. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 308 (finding that courts have
consistently employed strict liability for copyright offenses, refusing to honor lack of
knowledge as a defense).
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138

to control or supervise the direct infringer. There is, however, no
139
bright line rule concerning the level of control necessary.
The gravamen of copyright holders’ complaints against the FTSs is
that they facilitate direct infringement and are liable as contributory
140
infringers. In contrast to vicarious liability, control or supervision is
141
not necessary for a finding of contributory infringement. Providing
opportunity and inducing infringement have been the bases for
142
In Screen Gems v. Mark-Fi Records,
numerous findings of liability.
143
Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the
defendant advertising agency in a contributory infringement case
because it deemed the issue of whether the defendant’s creation of

138. See Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
“the elements of vicarious liability” for infringement are “‘(1) [t]he right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity; and (2) [a]n obvious and direct financial interest
in exploitation of copyrighted materials.’” (quoting RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas
& Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988))). One court noted that vicarious
infringement is based on the “well established” respondeat superior precepts of tort
liability. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(distinguishing between vicarious infringement and contributory infringement).
139. Courts tend to engage in an ad hoc factual determination. See Fonovisa, 76
F.3d at 262-63 (finding the operator of a swap meet liable for infringing sales of
individual vendors because the operator could control access to the meet area);
Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (reasoning that music artists’ manager was liable
for infringement because he supervised the concerts at which the artists performed);
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929)
(holding that a dance hall owner was liable for infringing performances on the
premises because of the ability to control the venue).
140. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2000 WL 573136, at
*9 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000) (noting that the plaintiffs claimed that “Napster willfully
turn[ed] a blind eye to the identity of its users” and ignored users’ infringing activity
even while aiding it); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that although the plaintiffs charged direct
infringement by the defendant, MP3.com’s claim that it merely facilitated fair use by
its consumers was specious since a “space shift” by individuals was not in itself fair
use); see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the piracy allegedly enabled by
Diamond’s Rio MP3 player concerned the RIAA primarily).
141. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that providing opportunity for infringement was enough
to hold the operator of an electronic bulletin board system liable for the infringing
activities of users, given knowledge that infringing activity was occurring); Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that
charging consumers for using facilities to watch videos it was otherwise licensed to
rent constituted contributory infringement of plaintiffs’ exclusive right of public
performance).
142. See Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824-25
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding defendant liable for contributory infringement where it
had rented “Make-a-Tape” machines on its premises and allowed customers to copy
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works); Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 292 (noting that liability
for contributory infringement is based on “enterprise liability” concepts, which holds
one party liable for another’s conduct where the party was aware of the tortious
conduct and provided substantial encouragement or assistance).
143. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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advertisements for records at very low prices should have alerted the
144
The U.S. Courts of
defendant that the records were pirated.
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, and the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California extended the doctrine of contributory
infringement to Internet services and makers of computer
145
equipment.
In one case, the court found an electronic bulletin
board service operator liable for allowing the plaintiff’s copyrighted
146
pornographic images to be uploaded and distributed by users.
The increasing ubiquity of the Internet has encouraged courts to
refine the theory of contributory infringement to fit new technology.
In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online Communications Services,
147
Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California found that an Internet service provider (“ISP”) could not
be found liable for infringing material posted on its system if it
neither knew nor should have known that the material was
148
infringing.
This ruling signaled a trend towards the limitation of
149
contributory infringement liability for ISPs, later codified, and
150
distinguished Netcom from previous cases. If prosecutors were to try

144. See id. at 404 (opining that if the defendant previously had insisted on
receiving proof of rights to recordings, based on the low price of the recordings,
defendant could be held liable for contributory infringement based on its
constructive or actual knowledge of infringement).
145. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971-72
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the manufacturer of a computer application that
allowed consumers to edit the “display” of the plaintiff’s video game products was not
liable for contributory infringement because the editing constituted fair use); Russ
Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 514-15 (finding operators of an electronic bulletin
board system (BBS) on the Internet liable for contributory infringement because
users of the BBS uploaded plaintiff’s works onto the system and distributed them for
download); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL 780560, at *78 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1996) (finding a BBS operator liable for contributory
infringement where users of the BBS traded in copyright-protected video games and
the defendant provided, monitored, and operated the equipment and software used
for copying the games).
146. See Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 514 (finding that the defendants “clearly
induced, caused, and materially contributed to any infringing activity which took
place on their BBS.”).
147. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
148. Id. at 1372-73 (“The court does not find workable a theory of infringement
that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be
deterred.”).
149. This trend would culminate in the codification of the Netcom decision in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See Mark Robins, Digital Millennium Copyright Act Defenses for Providers of Online Storage
Services and Information Location Tools, 16 COMPUTER LAW. 11, 16-17 (1999) (discussing
the DMCA’s limitation of liability for ISPs following Netcom).
150. Compare Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361, and Sega Enters., 1996 WL 780560, at *8
(holding that liability for contributory infringement requires that the defendant
knows, or should have known, of infringing activity), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding the operator of an
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FTSs on criminal infringement charges they would probably have to
overcome the presumption of innocent facilitation established in
Netcom.
5.

Defenses to criminal infringement
The defenses used to negate a civil infringement claim may also
defeat a criminal infringement charge. As noted above, criminal
infringement requires both the necessary state of mind (willfulness)
and that the infringed work(s) exceed a value defined by section 506
151
of the Copyright Act.
Failure to meet these elements is fatal to a
criminal infringement action, but so too is the failure to defeat a valid
defense to the underlying basic infringement offense.
Two affirmative defenses, developed mostly in civil cases, are of
particular importance. First, as with civil infringement, the doctrine
152
of “substantial noninfringing uses” will most likely play a key role in

electronic bulletin board liable for contributory infringement despite lack of
knowledge of the infringing activity or intent to infringe).
151.
Criminal Infringement.—Any person who infringes a copyright willfully
either—(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain,
or (2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or
more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000,
shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, United States
Code. For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction or
distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement. (b) Forfeiture and Destruction.—When any
person is convicted of any violation of subsection (a), the court in its
judgment of conviction shall, in addition to the penalty therein prescribed,
order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing
copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equipment used in
the manufacture of such infringing copies or phonorecords. (c) Fraudulent
Copyright Notice.—Any person who, with fraudulent intent, places on any
article a notice of copyright or words of the same purport that such person
knows to be false, or who, with fraudulent intent, publicly distributes or
imports for public distribution any article bearing such notice or words that
such person knows to be false, shall be fined not more than $2,500. (d)
Fraudulent Removal of Copyright Notice.—Any person who, with fraudulent
intent, removes or alters any notice of copyright appearing on a copy of a
copyrighted work shall be fined not more than $2,500. (e) False
Representation.—Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of
a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided for by
section 409, or in any written statement filed in connection with the
application, shall be fined not more than $2,500. (f) Rights of Attribution
and Integrity.—Nothing in this section applies to infringement of the rights
conferred by section 106A(a).
17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
152. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (applying the
substantial non-infringing use doctrine for the first time in a copyright case). The
doctrine of substantial non-infringing uses is probably best defined as a subcategory
of “fair use,” but for the purposes of this Comment it shall be treated as a separate
category because of its importance to the issues explored herein, and in recognition
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determining whether FTSs are liable for the infringing activities of
some users. Second, fair use, by contrast, is a defense available
primarily to individual users, though it has far-reaching implications
for FTSs.
a.

Substantial noninfringing uses
153

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court borrowed the concept of “substantial noninfringing use” from
patent law to address the application of contributory copyright
154
In Sony, Universal Studios and Walt Disney
infringement.
Productions, both content producers, claimed that Sony was guilty of
contributory copyright infringement by marketing and selling the
Betamax video tape recorder, which allowed its users to make
155
unauthorized copies of television programs.
The Court held that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
156
unobjectionable purposes.”
Because the recorders could be used
157
158
for “time-shifting,” they could not be prohibited.
This apparent
extension of protection against contributory infringement claims was
tempered, however, by the Court’s insistence that the purveyor of the
159
copying device in question did not encourage unlawful copying.
The Court noted that if infringing should become “widespread,”
adversely impacting the market value of copyrighted works, a
160
different outcome might be warranted.

of its distinctive features in copyright jurisprudence. See MARSHALL LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 432-42 (3d ed. 1999).
153. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
154. See id. at 434 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b),(c), which impose liability for one who
“actively induces infringement of a patent”).
155. See id. at 435 (explaining the development of liability for contributory
infringement).
156. Id. at 442 (noting further that a product “need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” for the manufacturer to escape liability for contributory
infringement) (emphasis added).
157. See id. (explaining that “time-shifting” was the practice of taping a program
for later viewing and that copyright holders suffered no harm because the resulting
use was similar).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 435-38 (contrasting Sony’s lack of contact with customers after the
sale of the machines with the sale of an unauthorized film based on a copyrighted
work to “motion picture jobbers” in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
160.
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof
either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a
requirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense against
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161

In Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied this doctrine in finding that a
producer of CD-ROM products was not liable for contributory
infringement where it copied the “star pagination” of the West
162
National Reporter System. Importantly, though the defendant was
163
found to have copied West’s pagination, which West conceded to
be fair use, the court noted no evidence that the defendant
encouraged its customers to reproduce the protected “arrangement”
164
of the West reporters. Citing Sony, the court held that the CD-ROM
products had “substantial, if not overwhelming, noninfringing uses”
165
as research and citation tools.
In at least one case, the maker of a product designed primarily to
defeat copyright protection systems, a “black box,” found shelter
166
The
under the theory of substantial noninfringing uses.
defendant’s software enabled users to break the anti-copying
167
protections incorporated in the plaintiff’s diskettes.
The Fifth

predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future
harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the
intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if
it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated. In
this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with regard to home timeshifting.
Id. at 451.
161. 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
162. See id. at 708.
163. The court distinguished between pagination, the location of information
within the reporter, and arrangement, or the order of cases within the reporter. See
id. at 699-700. The court found that West’s “thin” copyright applied only to its
arrangement of the cases, because the information contained in them amounted to
compilations of facts or public material, and the pagination was merely incidental
and not the product of a “creative” endeavor. See id. at 698-99 (citing Feist Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
164. See id. at 706. But see West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219,
1229 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that an online database provider’s copying of
pagination constituted infringement); Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 924 F.
Supp. 918, 931 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that defendant CD-ROM manufacturer
infringed West’s copyright protections by copying pagination).
165. See Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 706-07 (finding that although the “CD-ROM
products” in question “might be used incidentally to replicate West’s arrangement of
cases,” they had “substantial, predominant and noninfringing uses as tools for
research and citation”).
166. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 256 (5th Cir. 1988).
Vault, a maker of diskettes that prevented users from copying the software written to
the diskette, charged Quaid with contributory infringement. Id. Quaid designed
software specifically for the purpose of countering the copy prevention technology
incorporated on Vault diskettes. Id. at 257. Citing Sony, the Vault court held that
Quaid’s software, RAMKEY, was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” because
it allowed owners of Vault diskettes to make archival copies pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 117(2), and exonerated Quaid. See id. at 262.
167. Id.

BAILEYPP.DOC

500

8/15/2001 11:40 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:473

Circuit found that defendant’s product enabled owners of the
diskettes to make archival copies, which it deemed to be a substantial
168
noninfringing use. The doctrine of substantial noninfringing uses
is a powerful tool in the defensive arsenal of companies developing
new technologies, and may well play a decisive role in the MP3
debate. The implications of this doctrine for criminal prosecutions
are discussed below.
b.

Fair use

Congress and the courts carved out several exceptions to the
exclusive rights of copyright holders, including the right, or
169
affirmative defense, of “fair use.”
Fair use inquiries involve a
balancing test in which four factors are considered:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
170
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
171

None of these factors is, by itself, dispositive.
A bright line test
172
for fair use is not only elusive, but made impossible by this statute.
After weighing these factors, certain activities constitute fair use of
copyrighted material, such as reproduction for research purposes
173
and use of quotations.
At the heart of the MP3 debate is the question of whether filetrading is a one-of-a-kind phenomenon, or whether it has something
more in common with these examples of fair use. Most MP3 cases
involve the reproduction or distribution of “whole” works and the
creative “nature” of music is clearly “within the core of the copyright’s

168. Id.
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also National Research Council, The Digital
Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, at http://books.nap.edu/html/
digital_dillemma/ch6.html (last visited May 22, 2000) (noting that whether fair use is
a right or an affirmative defense is a matter of some debate).
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
171. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(stating that the four factors are not considered exclusive, but merely the most
relevant).
172. See id. (noting that fair use “is an equitable rule of reason, [and] no generally
applicable definition is possible” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679)).
173. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678-79 (citing “quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work . . .
parody . . . reproduction by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a
damaged copy . . .” as acceptable examples of fair use).
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174

The character of file-trading is, however, not
protective” shield.
obviously within the prohibited sphere of uses, nor is it certain what
175
effect file-trading has upon the potential market for MP3s.
Courts interpret the “purpose and character” language of section
176
107 to prohibit uses that are “commercial” in nature, directly
177
benefiting the copier by eliminating the need to purchase the work.
Looking to the “nonprofit educational purposes” language of the
178
statute, courts first ask whether a use is “private” in nature, when
179
determining whether the character of the use is non-commercial
180
and, second, whether a use is “transformative.”
If a use alters a
work in a fashion that is either creative or has independent
intellectual value it is more likely to be found within the ambit of the
181
fair use doctrine.
The effect of a specific use upon the potential market for a work is
often characterized as “the single most important element of fair
182
use.”
Courts note that the effect on the potential market for the
183
“particular [form of the] work” is the correct focus of the inquiry.

174. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (finding that
the musical works of Roy Orbison were among the types of expression afforded the
greatest protection by copyright).
175. See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401, slip op. at 19 (9th Cir. Feb.
12, 2001) (noting that conflicting reports existed as to the damage caused to the CD
market, but finding that Napster was detrimental to the plaintiffs’ exploitation of the
online market).
176. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“The greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the
exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favor the
copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair.”).
177. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (noting that central to the commercial use
inquiry is “whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price”).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
179. See American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 922 (finding that fair use is often
found where a use “produces a value that benefits the broader public interest (citing
inter alia Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375 (1993);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307-09 (2d Cir.
1966))).
180. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (holding that “[a]lthough such transformative
use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works” (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455
n.40 (1984))).
181. See American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 923 (noting that non-transformative
uses usually present weak arguments for a finding of fair use).
182. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (considering the question of whether the
unauthorized publication of material from a manuscript constituted fair use and
finding that the intent of the defendant to “scoop” the plaintiff in a market
precluded a finding of fair use). But see American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926
(claiming that the Supreme Court abandoned this interpretation in Campbell).
183. See American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 927 (finding that the potential
market value of the “individual journal articles” that were copied were the relevant
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In addition, the phrase “potential market” includes markets not only
currently developed by copyright owners, but also those that are
184
viable for development.
Though each of the defenses discussed above has been developed
in the context of the civil law, each has equally important
ramifications in the criminal context. The effect of proving fair use
or some other valid defense is to negate any claim of infringement,
185
As
and without infringement there is no civil or criminal liability.
discussed below, the essential line between civil and criminal liability
is marked by a difference in motive and volume of infringing
186
activity.
6.

Copyright legislation in the digital age
In the 1990s, Congress passed a number of amendments to the
Copyright Act in an effort to address new technological challenges.
187
The Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992 addressed
188
concerns about the copying capacity of digital audio tape (DAT),
189
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) amended U.S.
copyright law in order to comply with the World Intellectual Property
190
Organization (WIPO) treaties, as well as to speak to the challenges
191
of digital technology. One of the significant features of the DMCA

scope of inquiry rather than the value or market for “journal issues and volumes”).
184. See id. at 928-30 (noting that not every conceivable use is a “potential market”
use and that courts have limited analysis to “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed markets” (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 59192)).
185. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting
that the essential difference between criminal and civil liability for copyright
infringement from 1897 to 1994 was the “commercial exploitation” of the work by
the infringer).
186. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
187. See Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.).
188. The AHRA, however, was primarily designed to combat the threats posed by
non-cyberspace technologies like DAT; its application to the problem of FTSs
offering access to MP3 files may be of somewhat dubious value. See Stephanie L.
Brauner, High-Tech Boxing Match: A Discussion of Copyright Theory Underlying the Heated
Battle Between the RIAA and MP3ers, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 8 (1999) (discussing the
application of fair use doctrine and the AHRA in the Diamond Multimedia Rio
litigation).
189. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512
(Supp. V 1999)).
190. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 32-33 (1998) (stating that the committee was
balancing the need to honor the United States’ commitment to the two WIPO
treaties with Congress’ commitment to the concept of “fair use”).
191. Even though the DMCA purports to clarify the rights and liabilities of ISPs
under 17 U.S.C. § 512, it has been a matter of some debate as to whether the rights
of content consumers and distributors have been adequately balanced. See David
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
673, 675 (2000) (criticizing the DMCA for failing to protect the fair use rights of
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is the codification of the Netcom ruling’s requirement of knowledge or
192
ISPs that do not have
“volition” for contributory liability.
knowledge of infringing activity cannot be found liable for
193
contributory infringement. These laws are illustrative of the recent
trend in Congress towards technology-specific remedies to perceived
194
threats to the current copyright regime. Neither the AHRA or the

content users); Damien Cave, Does Anybody Care About Fighting the DMCA? (May 19,
2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/05/19/dmca/print.html (quoting
the director of the American Library Association Office for Information Technology
Policy as stating, “[c]ourt cases are cropping up like mushrooms because the law is so
vague”); see also UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy, The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/dmca1.html (last
modified Feb. 8, 2001) (explaining the background of the DMCA). But see Matthew
Kane, Copyright and the Internet: The Balance Between Protection and Encouragement, 22 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 183, 199-200 (2000) (arguing the current legal regime adequately
balances the interests of users and copyright holders).
192. See Markiewicz, supra note 56, at 434 (noting section 512 essentially codifies
the Netcom ruling).
193.
(a) Transitory Digital Network Communications.—A service provider shall
not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason
of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of
that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing
connections, if—(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at
the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the
transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out
through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by
the service provider; (3) the service provider does not select the recipients of
the material except as an automatic response to the request of another
person; (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the
course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system
or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a
longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or
provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content . . . (d) Information Location Tools.—A service
provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online
location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer,
or hypertext link, if the service provider—(1)(A) does not have actual
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in the absence of
such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (d)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1999).
194. For example, sections 1002, 1004 of the AHRA also require the
compensation of artists and incorporation of “copying controls” by the
manufacturers and distributors of digital audio recording devices. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1002, 1004 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The AHRA clearly envisioned manufacturers
of copying hardware directly compensating copyright holders through payment of a
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DMCA,
however,
specifically
address
criminal
copyright
infringement.
Though arguably limited to copiers using DAT, language in the
legislative history of the AHRA shows some support for the
contention that non-commercial copying should be considered fair
195
use. Counsel for Napster attempted to make the AHRA an issue at
trial, claiming that its users are engaged in activity protected by the
AHRA and hence, Napster cannot be found liable of contributory
196
infringement where there is no direct infringement.
Whether the
language of the AHRA is sweeping enough to possibly include file197
sharing software remains an open question.

percentage on each unit sold as well as voluntary installation of copying controls. See
id. However, most file-trading services neither sell their software (eliminating the
need to pay royalties), nor utilize copying controls. See Ben Charny, Glaser: Let’s Make
Music Napster-Easy (July 25, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/
04586,2607181,00.html (reporting Emusic.com offers a library of 125,000 songs for a
ten dollar monthly fee); Anne L. DiPasquale, Copyright Issues of Online Music,
INTERNET NEWSLETTER: LEGAL AND BUS. ASPECTS, Apr. 1999, at 7 (noting the
GoodNoise Corporation was recently granted a license to publish music from certain
recording companies for 7.1 cents per downloaded song).
195. The legislative history includes one pronouncement that AHRA contains
“exemptions from liability for suit under title 17 for home taping of copyrighted
musical works and sound recordings . . . . In the case of home taping, the exemption
protects all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical
recordings.” See H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 24 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3594.
196.
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright
based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio
recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording
device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use
by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical
recordings or analog musical recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
The AHRA creates an exemption for certain personal digital copies. See id.
(creating an exemption for certain personal, digital copies). See also Copyrights: Ninth
Circuit Stays Injunction in Napster Case Pending Appeal, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
L. DAILY, Aug. 1, 2000, at D2 (noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit overturned a preliminary injunction, citing unresolved issues including, inter
alia, Napster’s AHRA defense).
197. “[N]oncommercial” recordings of consumers who use “digital audio
recording devices” are exempt from claims of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). Although a file-sharing application like Napster is clearly
digital and audio in nature, it is perhaps less certain whether what it does is recording
and whether it is a device within the meaning of the statute. See id. Section 1001
defines a “‘digital audio recording device’” as “any machine or device of a type
commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included
with or as part of some other machine or device,” which is primarily designed to
make copies “for private use.” DAT is clearly the target of the statute. See id. § 1001;
see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-1100, at H783-61 (1992) (“[T]he purpose of the act is to
create the necessary legal environment for digital audio technology (DAT) to be
commercialized in the United States.”); Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the
Digital Age: Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8
(2000) (discussing the problems with congress’ enactment of the AHRA).
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One aspect of the DMCA that may gain importance in the near
future is its ban of the circumvention of technological protection
198
199
As some critics note, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 purports to
measures.
clarify the prohibition against black box technology, but it also
prevents purchasers of copyrighted works from making traditional
200
201
“fair use” copies of those works.
Currently, most musical works,
recorded in standard formats like the compact disc, are not protected
202
Section 1201 may play a more
by such anti-copying technologies.
pivotal role in criminal infringement litigation as protection
203
technology is applied to all musical formats.
Even though fair use provides a defense for individuals, the
204
DMCA’s “safe harbor” represents the creation of a special defense
for organizations (ISPs) against charges of contributory or vicarious
205
Section 512 differentiates among several
copyright infringement.
206
functions, requiring differing methods of compliance for an ISP

198. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 537-46
(1999) (averring that the anti-circumvention exceptions are unduly narrow and that
circumvention for a number of “legitimate reasons should be privileged”).
199. See generally Nimmer, supra note 191, at 673 (lamenting section 1201’s
evisceration of fair use rights and possible inauguration of a “pay-per-use” intellectual
property regime); Samuelson, supra note 198, at 519 (criticizing section 1201 as
inhibiting fair use).
200. See Nimmer, supra note 191, at 723-25 (noting that, though the legislative
history of the DMCA purported to make no changes to the fair use doctrine of
section 107, section 1201 violations preclude a fair use defense entirely).
201. See infra Part I.B.5.b (explaining the fair use doctrine).
202. See Jeff Howe, Net Loss: Music Industry Report Projects Huge Losses to Web Piracy
(May 24-30, 2000), at http://www.villagevoice.com/ issues/0021/howe.shtml
(“[E]very CD sold in the stores is a CD that someone will post for free online.”).
203. Most musical formats do not offer technological protection, such as
encryption. This is especially true of the most popular format, the compact disc
(CD). Though it is possible to encrypt CDs, the fact that almost all music recorded
to date is currently available in unprotected digital format means that this music will
remain forever available for pirates to copy without having to bother taking
sophisticated, or even basic anti-circumvention measures. See Richard Barry, ECTS:
Copying CDs Just Got Harder (Sept. 7, 1998), at http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/1998/
35/ns-5422.html (describing a California-based company’s “SafeDisc” software that
encrypts CDs with a digital signature). One could foresee a technology that serves
both as a distribution device, like Gnutella, and as an circumvention device.
Presently, however, such technology remains hypothetical, largely because there is no
need for it. See Brad Biddle, Consumer Rights vs. Encryption (Feb. 23, 1999), at
http://www.mp3.com/news/178.html (discussing software programs “Total
Recorder” and “Audiojacker” and their use as circumvention devices in conjunction
with MP3 use and file-trading on the MP3.com site).
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
205. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 77-84 (1998) (stating that Section 512
provides exemptions for “service providers” defined generally by provision of access
to the Internet).
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(n) (Supp. V 1999) (providing that whether a service
provider is held liable under one subsection has no bearing on whether the provider
is liable under a separate subsection).
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depending on which of these functions it performs. Since the safe
harbor provisions are applicable only to service providers that lack
the kind of direct involvement and knowledge of questionable filesharing that FTSs have, section 512 will most likely play a role in civil
trials, rather than in criminal prosecutions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Is File-Sharing an Inherently Criminal Activity?
File-sharing is arguably not intrinsically infringing. Theoretically,
there are many non-infringing uses for file-sharing technology.
Sharing non-copyrighted works, or works considered to be within the
208
public domain, is not infringement.
Thus, using file-sharing
software to share public-domain material is one potential noninfringing use.
Similarly, there are some circumstances in which file-sharing may
constitute fair use. If, for example, a file containing a “quotation of
209
short passages in a scholarly or technical work” were transmitted via
Gnutella for research purposes, the act of transmission would not
210
constitute infringement.
Fair use is a technologically neutral

207. Section 512, subsections (a) through (d), divides ISP functions into four
basic categories; transmission, temporary storage, storage of information on an ISP’s
system “at the direction of users,” and “linking users to an online location containing
infringing material or infringing activity.” The DMCA requires that, in certain
circumstances, parties engaging in one or more of these activities take measures
against copyright infringement in order to receive exemption from liability. See Irina
Y. Dmitrieva, Note, I Know It When I See It: Should Internet Providers Recognize Copyright
Violation When They See It?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 233, 240-42
(2000) (describing the affirmative defenses created by section 512 and
differentiating between the functions performed by ISPs). For instance, some ISPs
must take measures to disable access to users or sites that engage in infringing
activity. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (Supp. V 1999). But see id. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(B) (an
ISP which functions as a “location tool” is not required to take measures unless it has
“actual knowledge” of infringement or is “aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent.”). One may contrast section 512(a), applicable to
“transitory digital network communications,” which does not contain either the
“actual knowledge” or the “take down” requirements of section 512(d), which applies
to location tools.
208. Generally, copyrights are extinguished seventy years after the death of the
author or creator of the work, thus entering the public domain pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). Sound recordings are peculiar, however, in that section 301(c) allows state
or common law copyright protection of works created prior to 1972, until February
15, 2047. Only as of February 15, 1972, did sound recordings become subject to
federal copyright protection. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat 391.
209. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678.
210. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (“[R]eproduction in copies or phonorecords . . .
for purposes such as . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
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concept, and thus, whether the medium used is a mimeograph or an
211
When file-sharing is nonMP3, fair use copies are not infringing.
commercial and does not harm the potential market for the work or
data that is traded, there is a strong argument that this activity
212
constitutes fair use.
There are, on the other hand, many potentially infringing uses for
file-sharing software. Placing a large quantity of files of proprietary
software and musical works on the web for others to download free of
213
charge, constitutes infringement.
The file-sharing activities on
Napster are arguably similar. Users basically allow their hard drive, or
214
In this way, the
a portion of it, to be searched by other users.
Napster user’s hard drive is essentially made accessible via the
Internet, which has the same effect as providing access to infringing
215
material on a web site.
Users are “distributing” protected
216
material. Section 106 does not differentiate between the manner in
217
which material is reproduced or distributed, making a distinction
based on the difference between “posting” and “trading”
meaningless. Fair use is probably not a viable defense when MP3s are

211. The statutory guidelines for fair use do not account for particular methods
used for reproduction, focusing instead on the purpose of reproduction and the
effect of reproduction on the market for the work. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 6566; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
212. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922-30 (2d Cir. 1995)
(discussing the provisions of section 107 of the Copyright Act and noting that there
is a strong presumption that non-commercial uses that have little effect on the
market for the work are fair uses).
213. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994)
(suggesting that the prosecution should have charged an MIT student with
contributory criminal copyright infringement for facilitating the copying of software
and music from his web site).
214. See John Borland, Gnutella Viruses Weaker than Email Bugs, Experts Say (June 5,
2000), at http://www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-2020899.html (explaining that the
security issues of file-sharing are acute because users “open their hard drives directly
to one another, without any way of verifying other peoples’ identities or intentions”);
Gnutella Network Frequently Asked Questions, at http://gnutella.wego.com/go/
weg.pages.pa. . .olderID=118398&panelId=119597&action=view (last modified May
28, 2000) (“Gnutella only shares the folders which you specify - this can be changed
in the configuration area of Gnutella.”).
215. See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536 (describing LaMacchia’s posting of
software to a BBS, colloquially known as a “warez” cite, for downloading).
216. See Linton Weeks, Don’t Steal This Book, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1
(noting that the American Association of Publishers has shown concern for the
potential threat of illicit distribution and “duplication facilitators like Napster and
Gnutella”).
217. Fixation (reproduction) is defined by section 101 as fixing a work in an
“embodiment . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 (noting that the unauthorized “first public
distribution of an authorized copy” as well as “unauthorized public distribution of
copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an infringement”).
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traded. The downloader does benefit directly, “profit[ing] from the
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
218
Also, a defendant need not make a business of
customary price.”
infringement, so long as they get for free something for which they
219
otherwise would have had to pay.
Though it is less certain whether the potential market for musical
220
works, in general, is harmed by MP3 trading, courts interpret
section 107 to require that a use not compete with “traditional,
reasonable, or likely to be developed markets” in order to be afforded
221
protection. Because the record labels are already pursuing sales of
222
MP3s or their equivalent online, a court could easily find that file223
trading negatively impacts the market for music sales online.
Assuming that at least some of the activity on FTSs is infringing, it is
possible that individual users and/or the FTSs may be subject to
charges of criminal infringement.

218. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
(noting that central to the commercial use inquiry is whether the defendant gains
from not having to pay for a work otherwise unavailable).
219. Id.
220. See Lisa M. Bowman, Napster Marches Back to Court (July 25, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2606923-2,00.html
(noting
that independent surveys had indicated that Napster users were more likely to buy
more CDs than people who did not sample music using file-trading systems); Laura
Carr, Stats Speak Kindly of Napster (July 21, 2000), at http://www.thestandard.com/
article/article_print/1,1153,17057,00.html (citing a survey that indicated that the
majority of Napster users bought albums they otherwise would not have after
sampling them online); Jimmy Guterman, Why the Labels Should Love Napster (July 24,
2000), at http://www.thestandard.com/ article/article_print/1,1153,16966,00.html
(claiming that Napster has boosted media attention for the record industry and
provides an excellent venue for labels to profit in the future); Press Release, Jupiter
Research Center, Jupiter Finds Napster Users are 45 Percent More Likely to Increase
Music
Spending
(July
21,
2000),
at
http://www.jup.com/
company/pressrelease.jsp?doc=pr000721 (finding that “Napster usage is one of the
strongest determinants of increased music buying”); David Segal, Napster Looking for a
Groove, WASH. POST, July 26, 2000, at E1 (noting that Napster CEO Hank Berry has
claimed that the file-trading activities of Napster’s 23 million users has boosted
record sales by eight percent in the first quarter of 2000).
221. See supra text accompanying note 184.
222. See Caney, supra note 59 (noting that Time Warner and BMG Entertainment
had settled a lawsuit with MP3.com, licensing music to MP3.com for sale online);
Charny, supra note 194 (reporting that Emusic.com offers a library of 125,000 songs
for a ten dollar monthly fee with royalties paid to the labels).
223. The impact of MP3 trading to the larger music market is not relevant to a
court’s “potential market” inquiry. In American Geophysical Union the court found
that the impact of copying individual articles from journals should be assessed not
against the impact of the copying on sales of entire editions of the journal, but rather
in respect to document delivery services, which could copy the articles and pay
royalties to the copyright holders. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 929 (2d Cir. 1995). Similarly, a court probably would find that the relevant
scope of the potential market inquiry for MP3s is in fact the online trading of MP3s
and not CD sales. Given this more limited scope, the purported effect of file-trading
in stimulating over-the-counter sales is moot.
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B. Criminal Liability for FTSs?
Criminal indictments against corporations are not as common as
224
indictments against individuals, but neither are they rare.
Section
225
506 allows criminal charges to be brought against any “person,”
including, presumably, a corporation, that distributes a protected
226
Criminal charges would probably be
work without permission.
based on one of the forms of third party liability discussed below.
1.

Contributory and vicarious criminal liability
It is unclear whether a FTS can be held criminally liable for the acts
of its users. Corporations are liable for the criminal acts of their
227
agents, though courts generally prohibit vicarious liability for
228
criminal acts. The key question is whether users are agents of the
229
FTS.
In the civil suit filed against Napster, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged,
inter alia, that Napster is liable for contributory and vicarious
230
Liability for facilitating
copyright infringement under federal law.

224. See H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of
Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279, 279 (1995) (exploring the
development of the law of vicarious corporate criminal liability and the judicial
treatment of such actions).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[A]ny person who infringes a
copyright willfully . . .”) (emphasis added).
226. Id. § 506(a)(2).
227. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 (4th Cir.
1985) (noting that corporations may be held criminally liable in some circumstances
where agents act with apparent authority of the corporation); Granite Constr. Co. v.
Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (1983) (holding that corporations may be liable
for manslaughter through their agents); People v. McArdle, 14 N.E.2d 683, 685 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1938) (holding that a corporation could be held liable for criminal violation
where penalty included fines); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996) (analyzing the prosecution of
criminal actions against corporations).
228. See State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. 1986) (holding that
vicarious liability for sales of alcohol to minors violated the State Constitution’s due
process clause); Davis v. City of Peachtree, 304 S.E.2d 701, 703-04 (Ga. 1983)
(holding due process considerations under the state constitution required that the
owner of a liquor store could not be found liable for selling alcohol to a minor where
an employee of the store made the actual sale).
229. This may not be as unlikely as it may seem. Napster itself has stated that its
users constitute “the system” it operates. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No.
C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000). Though not employees
of Napster, users perform the most important work–posting and sharing content. See
id. Napster clearly “authorizes” its users to perform these operations, while
disavowing any activities that infringe on copyright. See id. The trial judge in the
RIAA’s case against Napster, however, has alleged that “copyright infringement” is
Napster’s raison d’etre. See id. For a general discussion of who qualifies as a corporate
agent, see Brown, supra note 224, at 285-89.
230. A & M Records, 2000 WL 573136, at *1.
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231

criminal acts roughly parallels the civil concept of vicarious liability.
232
If a corporation is found to have “induced” a criminal act, such as
233
encouraging its employees to drive recklessly, it can be found
criminally liable.
Section 506 imposes criminal liability for mere distribution,
234
regardless of financial gain, but it does not address situations where
235
To prevail, a
a party unknowingly facilitates infringement.
prosecutor would have to show that Napster not only encourages
infringement, and produces a product that enables users to infringe,
but also that Napster had actual or constructive knowledge of the
236
alleged infringement.
237
According to Napster, the DMCA and the AHRA provide it with

231.
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,
is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1429-32 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting and comparing the similarities between
vicarious liability for trademark infringement and criminal “aiding and abetting”
liability).
232. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994) (describing grounds for which a principal is
punishable).
233. See Michael Janofsky, Domino’s Ends Fast-Pizza Pledge After Big Award to Crash
Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993, at 1 (noting that an auto accident victim alleged
that the Domino’s policy of giving away pizzas not delivered within a set time period
may have encouraged its drivers to speed).
234. See Sergio G. Non, Can Napster Survive as a Business? (July 13, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2603462-2,00.html
(questioning Napster’s business model and potential profitability).
235. If third-party facilitators can be held criminally liable for aiding and abetting
infringement, it is unclear whether section 512(d) affords protection from a criminal
charge. Potential problems for a successful prosecution are legion, if it does apply.
Napster is not obligated to police its system, and difficulties abound when
determining whether the information traded on that system is “infringing.” The
legislative history of section 512 indicates that it exempts ISPs from contributory
infringement in all cases except where it is obvious that infringement is occurring.
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 45 (1998).
236. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that to be found liable for contributory infringement a defendant
must actively aid in direct infringement rather than merely have knowledge of the
infringement (citing Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990))).
237. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“A ‘digital audio recording
device’ is any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for
use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some other machine or
device, the digital recording function of which is designed or marketed for the
primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording
for private use, except for—(A) professional model products, and (B) dictation
machines, answering machines, and other audio recording equipment that is
designed and marketed primarily for the creation of sound recordings resulting from
the fixation of nonmusical sounds.”). This vague definition may allow courts to find
the Napster browser a “device” within the meaning of the statute.
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exemptions from either vicarious or contributory infringement
238
Napster’s claim essentially rests upon its allegedly passive
liability.
role as a location tool, for which the DMCA provides safe harbor, and
the “home taping” nature of its users activities, which the AHRA
239
exempts from claims of infringement.
It remains to be seen
whether either of these defenses will prove adequate in the civil suit.
240
The emphasis on volitional conduct in the Netcom ruling and its
statutory offspring also pose a challenge. Because the DMCA
knowledge requirement practically prevents the use of imputed
241
knowledge against third-party service providers, prosecutors would
242
most likely have to prove actual knowledge of the infringing activity.
The drafters of the NET Act also seem to envision an exemption for
243
third-party facilitators who lack direct knowledge.
2.

Conspiracy and accomplice liability
If Napster fails to find safe harbor in the DMCA or the substantial
noninfringing use doctrine, traditional approaches to multiple party
criminal liability may provide an effective approach to prosecution.
Two intriguing possibilities for prosecutors are charging Napster with
conspiring to criminally infringe and aiding and abetting criminal
infringement.
244
Conspiracy is defined by federal statute. Prosecutors must prove
that “two or more persons conspire to commit any offense against the

238. Napster claimed that it qualifies for a safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
Napster asserted that its system merely served a passive role as a “conduit” or router
and, therefore, qualified for the protection of section 512(a) as would, theoretically,
ISPs like AOL, which provide access to the Internet. See A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
In denying Napster’s motion for summary judgment, the court sided with the record
labels, however, finding that, if Napster was a “service provider” for section 512
purposes, it was more like a search engine, similar to Yahoo!, and thus should be
analyzed under section 512(d). Id. The court similarly dismissed the AHRA
exemption for home taping as inapplicable to the facts of the case. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there
should be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”).
241. See Dmitrieva, supra note 207, at 254-55.
242. See generally Robins, supra note 149, at 17 (arguing that the DMCA may
require actual ability to control usage for ISPs to be liable for civil damages).
243. See 143 CONG. REC. H9883-01, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte) (“Evidence of reproductions or distributions, including those made
electronically on behalf of third parties, would not, by itself, be sufficient to establish
willfulness under this act.”).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting that the purpose of a
conspiracy can be to “commit an offense” [i.e., violate a specific statute] or to
“defraud”).
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United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to
245
Thus, the government must
effect the object of the conspiracy.”
246
show that there is: (1) an agreement to commit a crime, and (2) an
overt act in furtherance of that agreement. The agreement need not
be explicit; it is enough that the party charged has a “stake in the
247
248
venture.”
In Direct Sales Co. v. United States the Supreme Court
held that the agreement element could be satisfied by evidence of a
tacit understanding. There, the Court found evidence that a
wholesaler’s sales of a prescription drug to an individual doctor far
exceeded the volume of potential legitimate use was enough to
249
establish an implicit agreement to engage in illicit activity.
Napster arguably has “knowledge” that its system is used for illegal
250
acts. Napster need not “act to effect” criminal infringement, as only
one party to a conspiracy must do so for all members of the
251
conspiracy to be found guilty.
It would be sufficient, under the
federal conspiracy statute, that the actions of users fall within the
252
scope of Section 506.
Those who facilitate the commission of a crime are held liable as
253
The
principals under the federal accomplice liability statute.
elements of “aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)” are “that
the defendant became associated with a criminal venture and

245. Id.
246. In Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713-15 (1943), the Court
found the fact that sales of a prescription drug far exceeded the volume of legitimate
use was enough to establish an implicit agreement to engage in illicit activity. See also
United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1256 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that a single
indication of willingness to aid in the commission of an offense was enough to infer
agreement).
247. But see G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflection on Reves v. Ernst &
Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy
Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1431-32 (1996) (noting that the
Supreme Court never officially adopted the “stake in the venture” requirement
proposed by Judge Learned Hand, instead adopting an “intent” theory of
culpability).
248. 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
249. See id.
250. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-5183 MHP, C 00-0074
MHP, 2000 WL 1009483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000) (asserting that over 85
percent of the music traded on Napster is copyrighted).
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (where “one or more [conspirators] do any act to
effect the object of their conspiracy, each shall be” punished accordingly).
252. It is also unlikely that a prosecutor would need to prove that there was
explicit communication among users. See United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 92223 (2d Cir. 1938), rev’d on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (finding that there
was no need to prove communication between members of a drug smuggling ring
where importers knew that middlemen would require the assistance of retailers and
vice versa). Given the rather limited evidentiary requirements of Direct Sales, this
might be enough to support a conspiracy conviction.
253. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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participated in it . . . . Association means that the defendant shared
in the criminal intent of the principal. Participation means that the
defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the
254
A prosecutor must show that the defendant acted with
venture.”
255
the intent to aid in the accomplishment of the crime, merely
furnishing goods used in the crime is not enough.
Napster’s active creation and maintenance of an index of users,
which allows criminal infringers to find material they wish to target,
could fulfill the participation element. It is less certain whether a
court would find that Napster shared the intent of criminal
infringers. The intent necessary for accomplice liability does not
always require that the aider and abetter actively desire the actual
256
outcome of the criminal venture.
In some circuits, “mere
knowledge” that the aid will help in the accomplishment of the crime
257
is sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement. Under this standard,
258
Napster would most likely be found sufficiently culpable.
C. Criminal Infringement and File-Sharing Software Users
Regardless of the outcome of litigation against Napster, individual
users of systems like Napster may have reason to fear charges of
259
Thus far, content producers such as the
criminal infringement.

254. United States v. Colwell, 764 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1985).
255.
[A] conspiracy also imports a concert of purpose . . . . At times it seemed to
be supposed that, once some kind of criminal concert is established, all
parties are liable for everything anyone of the original participants does, and
even for what those do who join later. Nothing could be more untrue.
Nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted
purpose or agreement as he understands it; if later comers change that, he is
not liable for the change; his liability is limited to the common purposes
while he remains in it. The confusion is perhaps due to the fact that
everything done by the conspirators—including the declarations of later
entrants—is competent evidence against all, so far as it may fairly be thought
to be in execution of the concert to which the accused is privy, though that
doctrine too is often abused.
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1938).
256. See Candace Courteau, Comment, The Mental Element Required for Accomplice
Liability: A Topic Note, 59 LA. L. REV. 325, 328 (1998) (“[S]tandards [for the mens rea
element] range from 1) mere knowledge that the accomplice’s assistance will help in
the commission of the offense, to 2) the accomplice’s own intent to commit the
offense.”).
257. See id.
258. In one case a court seemed to suggest an ordinary sale, made with the
knowledge that the buyer intended to commit a crime, would be sufficient for a
finding of aider and abetter liability because of the “moral obligation to prevent the
commission of a felony, if possible.” See Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637
(4th Cir. 1940).
259. See Richard Barry, Jail Term for MP3 Pirates Predicted (May 16, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/2000/19/ns-15408.html (quoting a senior music
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RIAA are satisfied to target companies that produce MP3 software or
260
261
equipment. Napster’s relatively deep pockets may satisfy the RIAA
and aggrieved artists in civil actions. Direct infringement by
individuals, however, is the sine qua non of infringing activity on the
Napster system specifically, and among file-traders generally. Even
without the FTSs, individuals using true P2P software can carry on the
same activities. Record labels probably will choose to push for more
aggressive criminal prosecution of individual infringers as a general
262
deterrence strategy.
A combination of factors, however, may make the criminal
prosecution of individual infringers extremely complex. The most
significant obstacles to prosecution will be: (1) finding a means for
identifying infringers that is both technologically possible and
constitutionally acceptable, (2) finding targets whose infringing
activity exceeds the statutory minimum value for criminal liability,
and (3) proving the mens rea requirement of criminal infringement.
1.

Identification of criminal infringers
Identification of the accused infringers may produce the first
technical and legal challenge to potential prosecution. ISPs and
service providers like Napster have no duty to police their own
263
To obtain civil relief, the RIAA,
systems to identify infringers.
record labels, or individual artists expended their own resources
necessary to seek out the infringers, including hiring private
264
investigators to track down individual infringers.
Identifying users for prosecution on criminal infringement charges

industry executive as proclaiming that an “individual found downloading illegal MP3
tracks” will go to jail “as a clear signal that piracy will not be tolerated in the U.S.”).
260. See Jon O’Hara, No-Fuss Gnutella Could Mean Napster-Sized Trouble (June 28,
2000), at http://www.inside.com/story/Story_Cashed/0,2770,6280,00.html (quoting
the president of the RIAA as saying that it has chosen to pursue legal action against
those illegally distributing works rather than those consuming the works); Brauner,
supra note 188, at 14 (discussing liability for third parties and “contributory
conduct”).
261. See Brad King, Big Money Feast for Napster (May 22, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36502,00.html (reporting a deal between
venture capital firm Hummer Winblad and Napster, securing $15 million in
financing for Napster).
262. See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 325-26 (arguing that the RIAA should
vigorously prosecute offenders as a means of controlling infringement).
263. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.
2, at 45 (1998) (stating that Section 512(d) does not require ISPs to “make
discriminating judgements about potential copyright infringement”).
264. See Napster Draws Members from Lawsuit (May 23, 2000), at
http://www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1931171.html (explaining that Napster was
required under the DMCA to disable the access of users who Metallica named as
likely infringers in an investigation funded by the band).
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may raise much more complex legal questions than those raised by
civil litigation. Government actors may face a more difficult challenge
in identifying actual infringers because the evidentiary standards for a
265
criminal conviction are stricter than in civil suits. Also, the rules
governing government investigations, especially search and seizure
266
guidelines, create special limitations.
When looking for targets using FTSs like Napster, government
investigators may attempt to obtain information about the identity of
file-traders and the content or volume of transfers directly from the
FTS. Under federal law, however, a warrant must be obtained in
order to compel an “electronic communication service” to disclose
267
information about its customers or the contents of their accounts.
If a warrant was obtained, an FTS would probably have to divulge any
relevant information about its users. It is unclear just how much
268
information about individual users FTSs maintain.
Nevertheless,
private investigators found ways to determine the “user IDs” of
269
Napster users.
Future prosecutions will probably not, however, involve users of
270
Technologies that are more decentralized,
systems like Napster.
with greater potential for copyright mayhem, will most likely replace
271
the Napster model.
Identifying criminal infringers using true P2P
technology presents the next challenge in enforcing intellectual
property law.

265. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.”), with Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987) (finding that a
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate for civil suits including
paternity proceedings).
266. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (“The basic purpose of th[e]
[Fourth] Amendment, as recognized by countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. V 1999) (discussing when a provider can disclose
information about a subscriber to a government entity).
268. Copyright holder Metallica was able to hire a private investigation firm to
determine the “usernames” of over 300,000 Napster users who it believed were
specifically trading MP3s containing Metallica’s material. See John Borland et al.,
Napster May Block Hundreds of Thousands of Fans (May 3, 2000), at
http://news.cnet.com/news//0-1005-202-1810391.html. Napster’s usernames do
not by themselves, however, include the actual names or other information about
particular users. Id. Investigators claim that they were able to determine the names
of the Metallica songs shared, the time that those songs were offered for download,
and the IP addresses of those offering the material. Id.
269. See id.
270. See Andy Oram, Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation
(May 12, 2000), at http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/208 (touting P2P Gnutella and
Freenet as “a new step in distributed information systems”).
271. Id.
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272

Identification of these infringers will be far more difficult. There
273
is no “Gnutella, Inc.” With true P2P technology, finding an entity
274
to sue for contributory infringement is probably impossible, and
there is no readily available source for identifying users. The hackers
who have developed this software do so neither for “financial gain,”
275
nor maintain records of individuals who obtain the software.
It is
also unlikely, primarily because of their tenuous connection to
individual users, that criminal charges could be brought against these
276
hackers under other provisions of the NET Act or DMCA.
With the exception of a few companies that integrated the software
277
into their web sites, Gnutella does not provide a useful source for
278
gathering information on individual criminal infringers. Since law

272. See Robert MacMillan, Justice Department, Rep. Coble Spar Over NET Act,
NEWSBYTES, May 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5122289 (“[P]rosecution of a crime
that can be committed with ‘only a $600 computer and an Internet account’ are far
more difficult to track down and prosecute than larger clear-cut cases of physical
copyright piracy.”).
273. See O’Hara, supra note 260 (“[Gnutella] isn’t supported by any one individual
or company, it just is.”).
274. See Roush, supra note 41 (explaining the “open-source” development of
Gnutella).
275. Not only does Gnutella not maintain records, but there are hundreds,
perhaps thousands of Gnutella clones, or variations of the software, created by
individual designers and downloaded by users. See Giancarlo Varanini, On Spreading
Gnutella (Apr. 10, 2000), at http://music.zdnet.com/features/nerdherd/
(describing the freelance developers of Gnutella).
276. Assuming that a P2P application was found to be a circumvention device
within the meaning of section 1201, criminal penalties could be brought against the
designer under section 1204. Section 1204, however, retains both the willfulness and
“financial gain” requirements of pre-NET Act criminal infringement liability.
Therefore, it is unlikely that Gnutella and Freenet are susceptible to criminal
prosecution under section 1204. For these reasons, it is likely that the RIAA and
other copyright holders will push for more prosecutions of individuals on criminal
infringement charges. It is doubtful that Gnutella or Freenet could be classified as
anti-circumvention devices. Neither application has the capability to “descramble a
scrambled work” or “decrypt an encrypted work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(3)(A0-(B)
(1994); id. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”); Shahram A.
Shayesteh, Note, High-Speed Chase on the Information Superhighway: The Evolution of
Criminal Liability for Internet Piracy, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 183, 219-20 (1999)
(explaining the creation of a second “LaMacchia loophole” in section 1204); Kathryn
Balint, Music Won’t Die When Napster Walks the Plank: Web Site Ordered Halted, but Online
Piracy Thrives, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 28, 2000, at A1 (claiming that the
recording industry’s “only recourse” in fighting Gnutella and FreeNet is litigation
against individuals).
277. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Net Film Firm Taps Gnutella for Video Sales (June 14,
2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-2080146.html (announcing the
use of Gnutella by SightSound.com combined with Microsoft’s digital rights
management system); Jon O’Hara, No-Fuss Gnutella Could Mean Napster-Sized Trouble
(June 28, 2000), at http://www.inside.com/story/Story_Cashed/0,2770,6280,00.html
(citing, inter alia, Zeropaid.com, Spinfrenzy.com, and Surfy.com, as companies using
Gnutella to facilitate MP3 trading on the web).
278. The developers of Gnutella keep no records identifying individual users. See
Chris Nelson, Digital Nation: There’s Just No Stopping Gnutella (July 30, 2000), at
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enforcement officials cannot serve a warrant and obtain member lists
or username databases from Gnutella, identification of infringers
must be made through other means.
Though some touted Gnutella as a virtually invincible piracy-tool
279
because of its supposed anonymity, there are gaps that might allow
280
law enforcement agents to identify infringers. Agents might be able
to detect the potentially infringing activity of Gnutella users based on
281
They could also log onto a
the volume of transmitted material.
network of Gnutella users and monitor the volume of downloading
282
283
or uploading of various Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
Doing
so would allow officials to find the identity of the users, as long as the
ISP providing the user with Internet access agreed, or could be
284
compelled, to divulge the account information for that IP address.
Given a sufficient volume, and perhaps after sampling the material
offered by an uploader, agents might have enough evidence for a
285
warrant to search and seize a suspect’s hard drive.

http://www.sonicnet.com/news/archive/story.jhtml?id=820234 (questioning the
value of lawsuits directed against Gnutella, or its original “parent” company, AOL).
279. See id. (noting that AOL terminated the Gnutella project, created by AOL’s
Nullsoft division, because of fear of its use for piracy).
280. See Future of Digital Music, supra note 75 (statement of Gene Kan, developer
and founder of Infrasearch, Inc.) (“Gnutella . . . involves no central server,
eliminating the possibility of easily controlling the habits of Gnutella users by strictly
legal means. Gnutella is only pseudo-anonymous. FreeNet corrects that. It, like
Gnutella, is fully distributed with no central server, and it is completely anonymous.”)
(emphasis added).
281. See Kelly McCollum, Student Gets 2 Years Probation in Copyright Case, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 10, 1999, at A51 (stating that the infringing activity of University
of Oregon student Jeffrey Levy was discovered when campus computer intranet
administrators noticed the extremely high volume of activity on his account).
282. IP addresses are assigned to each computer when it logs onto the Internet. In
some cases, individual users that access the Internet via an ISP like AOL by “dialing
up” are assigned a different IP number each time. Even these “dynamic IP
addresses” do not provide a method for identification, however, as ISPs assign these
addresses. For more information about IP addresses, see Find Out Your Computer’s IP
Address, at http://www.chami.com/tips/Internet/041498I.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2000).
Gnutella
Copyright
Enforcement?
at
283. See
(June
22,
2000),
http://slashdot.org/articles/00/06/22/1242217.html (discussing the feasibility of
identification of Gnutella users by obtaining an IP address).
284. ISPs are required to release the personal information of consumers when
presented with a valid warrant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
285. One of the important questions before magistrate judges in the future may
be whether simply identifying the type of files and volume of material traded are
grounds for probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding
that “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place”). Trading of vast quantities of information for legitimate purposes
is likely to become common place. If the hallmarks of copyright infringement
become diluted by legitimate activities that possess the same traits, it may be difficult
to convince a magistrate that probable cause exists. See United States v. Kithcart, 134

BAILEYPP.DOC

518

8/15/2001 11:40 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:473

Although Gnutella may be fallible because of its divulgence of
users’ IP addresses, Freenet and other cutting edge file-sharing
286
Freenet not only
applications do not share this Achilles heel.
removes the identifying signatures from Internet traffic, it also reacts
to attempted identification by distributing the data across more
287
“nodes,” creating a needle-in-the-haystack problem for investigators.
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), a
music industry “watchdog” organization, believes that Freenet poses a
288
challenge to which there may be no solution. Technological
289
However, as
countermeasures may, nevertheless, be found.
discussed below, fighting Freenet may come at a price society is
unwilling to pay.
2.

The elimination of the profit motive, the value of infringed works, and
fair use
The NET Act radically altered the elements of criminal
290
infringement when it eliminated the profit motive.
Section
506(a)(2) now allows prosecutors to charge an individual with
criminal infringement so long as they download or upload materials
291
with a value of more than $1,000. Prior to the spread of FTSs, the

F.3d 529, 531-32 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that the vague resemblance of two arrestees
and their vehicle to the suspects in a robbery was insufficient to support probable
cause for arrest given the imprecision of the description and the lack of
incriminating behavior on the part of the subjects); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d
116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that allegations corroborated only by evidence of
legal activities, including a regular flow of traffic and the fact that the suspect’s house
contained a basement, were insufficient to support a finding of probable cause).
286. See Features of Freenet, at http://www.freenet.sourceforge.net/ index.php?
page=features (last visited July 21, 2000) (explaining that Freenet allows both
downloaders and uploaders to remain anonymous unlike Internet traffic which is
labeled by IP address).
287. Id.
288. See Will Knight, Forget Napster, Keep Tabs on FreeNet (June 1, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2580356-2,00.html (quoting
an IFPA spokeswoman, “[w]e’re particularly concerned about this [technology]. It’s
kind of like Napster but you can’t tell where information is.”).
289. All technological measures are prone to countermeasures. See HUGO
CORNWALL, THE HACKER’S HANDBOOK (1985), available at http://rootshell.com/
docs/Hackers-Handbook (noting that technological measures like passwords may be
decrypted, while other systems may be infiltrated by “trojan horses” which “consist of
hiding away a bit of orthodox active code (like a virus) in a standard legitimate
routine”).
290. See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 326 (noting that the NET Act eliminated the
commercial motive of criminal infringement).
291. These changes reflect an emphasis on harm “inflicted” on copyright holders,
rather than the infringers’ gain. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(providing criminal sanctions against infringement of copyrighted works valued at
more than $1,000); 143 CONG. REC. H9883-01 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Cannon) (commenting that the bill considers harm to copyright owner and not
solely on pirate’s gain).
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Levy case made headlines as the first successful prosecution under the
NET Act, even though FBI agents could not determine the exact
292
The relatively vast
value of the loss caused by the infringement.
293
amount of data that passed through Levy’s account may have been
sufficient as evidence to prove that his activity passed the $1,000
threshold. The failure to prove the value of the infringing material
294
did, however, prevent Levy from being charged with a felony.
Similar problems related to evidence-gathering may plague
prosecutions of infringers using P2P technology, but, as with Levy,
proving the $1,000 minimum may not.
Technological development combined with the elimination of
295
profit motive may make for a vast number of potential prosecutions.
Many Napster users could easily reach the $1,000 minimum for
296
criminal liability, if not the $2,500 minimum for felony liability.
Levy operated a “warez site” or electronic Bulletin Board Service
297
(BBS) from his university’s system.
By comparison, using file298
sharing software is far less difficult.
Congress has traditionally
feared criminalizing widespread consumer habits in drafting
299
copyright law. Yet, such criminalization appears to be the outcome
of the advent of file-sharing in the wake of the NET Act’s elimination
of the profit motive as an element of criminal infringement.
300
An average Napster user, utilizing a standard 56kbps modem, can

292. See MacMillan, supra note 272.
293. See McCollum, supra note 281, at A51 (noting that, at one point, Levy
transferred 1.7 gigabytes of data within two hours).
294. Id.
295. According to at least one legislator, the NET Act was already underused to
prosecute criminal infringement cases in the Spring of 1999, before the advent of
Gnutella and the spread of Napster-like technology. See Implementation of the NET Act
and Enforcement Against Internet Piracy, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Coble) (complaining about the lack of prosecutions under the
NET Act because “there is no shortage of potential prosecutions”).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
297. See Bill Miller, Giveaways Costly for Web Pirate: U.S. Crackdown Yields Guilty Plea,
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1999, at B1 (noting that Levy was the first to be convicted for
operation of a “warez” site and violation of copyright laws).
298. BBSs often require the use of a pass code to gain access and are not always
connected directly to the Internet. See G. Malkin, Internet Users’ Glossary (Aug. 1996),
at http://freesoft.org/CIE/RFC/Orig/rfc1983.txt.
299. See Hearings on S. 893 Before the Subcomm. On Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 65 (1992) (statement of
Edward J. Black, General Counsel, Computer & Industry Association) (“You do not
want to be accidentally taking a large percentage of the American people, either
small businesses or citizens, into the gray area of criminal law.”).
300. Most consumers currently are using non-broadband Internet connections
modems. The standard non-broadband modem connects at the rate of 56kbs
(kilobytes per second). However, the trend toward the proliferation of high-speed
connections will allow the transfer of increasingly enormous amounts of information
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301

download approximately one song every eight to ten minutes.
302
Estimating that each copy of each song is worth about $1.60, a
Napster user would have to exchange 625 songs illicitly in order to
meet the $1,000 minimum for criminal prosecution. This task could
be accomplished in roughly 104 hours with a 56kbps modem. With a
DSL or cable Internet connection that rate could be reduced to
303
under twenty-six hours.
As standard hard drives begin to surpass
304
twenty gigabytes in storage, the requisite 1.875 gigabytes needed to
store 625 songs is not difficult to attain for many computer users.
Storage limitations present no legal obstacle, however, as the value of
305
uploaded works would count towards an aggregate value necessary
306
for prosecution.
Current technology does not prevent some users, however, from
exceeding the minimum $1,000 worth of illicit material in an even
shorter amount of time. In one notable case, the first prosecution
under the NET Act, a college student was indicted for criminal
infringement after campus computer operators noticed transfers of
307
over 1.7 gigabytes in under two hours.
Using the powerful

in shorter periods of time. See Transatlantic Cable, WIRED, Sept. 2000, at 110 (citing a
study by NetValue estimating that over 65% of American Internet users use 56K
modems); Broadband Users Mostly Young Rich Men (June 27, 2000), at
http://www.nua.ie/surveys/?f=VS&art_id=905355870&rel=true (citing a survey that
placed broadband usage [Cable and DSL connections] among American consumers
at nine percent). But see Strategis Group Survey, US Households Eager for High-speed Access
(Feb. 18, 2000), at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/?f=VS&art_id=905355603&rel=true
(finding that high speed access grew by 185% in the United States in 1999, and that
over twenty-five million households were projected to have high speed access by
2004).
301. See Miller, supra note 40 (noting that installation of the Napster browser and
downloading of three MP3s could be completed in under forty minutes).
302. This estimate is unscientific, based on the average cost of a typical ten-song
album at about $16.00. Web-based retailers typically sell MP3 singles for between
$1.00 and $2.49. See Nelson, supra note 278 (describing the various MP3 retailers
including BMGmusicservice.com, and Emusic).
303. Though this figure is reached by extrapolating from information in previous
infringement cases, including the LaMacchia case, the RIAA made the claim that
cable modem users can download an entire one-hour compact disc in three minutes.
See NET Act Hearing, supra note 119, at 146-49 (testimony of Cary H. Sherman, Senior
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of
America) (discussing estimated losses to the recording industry due to piracy).
304. Even as of May 1999 average hard drive configurations gave consumers over
seven gigabytes of storage. See Market Watch: Desktop PC, Average Hard Drive (May
at
1999),
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/pcdir/content/1999/05/marketwatch/desktops_hd.html.
305. “Uploaded” equates to “distributed” in the language of the statute. See 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
306. Section 506(a) creates liability for “reproduction or distribution.” Id. §
506(a). Thus, anyone “downloading” (reproducing) works is liable for the value of
those works combined with the value of all works “uploaded” (distributed) from his
or her computer.
307. See Andy Patrizio, DOJ Cracks Down on MP3 Pirate (Aug. 23, 1999), at
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resources of his university’s intranet, the student’s “typical amount of
traffic” could have reached the hypothetical criminal benchmark of
308
The elimination of the
625 songs in less than three hours.
“financial gain” requirement in section 506(a)(2), combined with the
309
high-speed access of university intranets, allows students to meet the
value requirements for a felony conviction in an afternoon of casual
“trading.”
Proving that infringement reaches the $1,000 minimum in filetrading cases can be both more difficult and easier for prosecutors
than in the Levy case. It would likely be burdensome to prove that
$1,000 worth of contraband files had been downloaded or uploaded
by an individual without gaining access to the target’s computer hard
drive, and to determine whether the target already owned authorized
310
versions of material downloaded.
An individual could very easily
trade the volume of material necessary to reach the $1,000 mark and
311
exchange only non-proprietary data.
Alternatively, if an individual downloaded material when he
already owned an authorized version, there is a strong possibility that
312
such activity falls within the scope of the fair use defense.
Investigators might discover that a high volume of material was

http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/21391.html.
308. At an average of three minutes per song, or three megabytes of data, 625
songs could be uploaded in just over two hours with a broadband connection. See
What is MP3?, at http://www.zdnet.com/zdhelp/stories/main/0,5594,22866162,00.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001).
309. An intranet is “a private network that uses Internet-related technologies to
provide services within an organization,” like those used by universities. See
Netdictionary, at http://www.netdictionary.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
310. To make this determination an investigator would probably have to perform
a search of the target’s home, automobile, and any other place where a CD might be
found. This method poses a difficult dilemma for probable cause determinations,
because it would be uncertain whether the target did in fact own an authorized copy
before an investigator attempted to obtain a warrant to search for unauthorized
copies and it would be almost impossible to disprove the existence of authorized
copies before performing a search. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556
(1978) (finding that the “critical element” in probable cause determinations “is
reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are
located on the property to which entry is sought”).
311. For example, digital files containing video or images made by an individual
user (using digital still or video cameras) could be traded with others and would
register as massive files, perhaps even dozens of gigabytes, and would never involve
the use of copyrighted works.
312. Napster has analogized MP3s downloaded to a computer with television
programs taped on a VCR. The musical works on MP3s are “space-shifted” to a
computer for personal convenience, just as television programs are “time-shifted” to
tape for more convenient viewing. Compare A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No.
C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000) (dismissing
Napster’s argument that “space-shifting” is fair use), with Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984) (finding that “time-shifting” is
fair use).
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traded, but would never know whether the traders already owned
authorized copies of that material without obtaining a search warrant.
Probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is located in a
313
In the
particular place is necessary for a search warrant to issue.
case of file-trading, investigators would be in the untenable position
of requiring a warrant to prove the lack of exculpatory material
because of the fair use doctrine.
3.

“Willful” infringement
Some commentators suggest that the willfulness requirement poses
an insurmountable obstacle to prosecution of criminal infringement
314
cases. Before the passage of the NET Act, the federal handbook for
prosecution of intellectual property crimes noted that “amass[ing]
evidence of intent in order to anticipate and rebut [the] ‘lack of
intent,’” or non-willfulness defense, was critical for a criminal
315
infringement prosecution. The handbook’s thinly veiled skepticism
316
towards the possibility of meeting this burden, attested to by the
317
relative paucity of criminal infringement prosecutions, may not be
necessary in the wake of the NET Act.
In most jurisdictions, prosecutors must prove that the accused had
at least constructive knowledge of the legal duty they are charged
with breaching when the mens rea of an offense is defined as
318
willfulness.
Napster, like many other web sites, utilizes “license
319
agreements” that include warnings about copyright violations.
It

313. See infra Part II.C.4.
314. See Wu, supra note 98, at 549-50 (“[N]otwithstanding the NET Act, which
effectively eliminates the commercial motive requirement to criminalize LaMacchialike behavior, criminal copyright enforcement remains hampered by the statutory
requirement that a defendant’s conduct be willful.”).
315. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Violations of Intellectual Property
Rights,
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/intell_prop_rts/SectIII.htm#III (updated Sept. 2, 1997) [hereinafter DOJ
Prosecution] (discussing criminal remedies for copyright violations).
316. Id. (“Indeed, under this construction, if a trier of fact was satisfied that a
defendant was not aware of the laws prohibiting copyright infringement, or was
satisfied that the defendant did not believe his acts infringed, it might constitute a
defense to the criminal charge.”).
317. Currently there are only two known prosecutions for criminal infringement
under the NET Act. See Miller, supra note 297, at B1.
318. See DOJ Prosecution, supra note 315 (noting that the Second and Ninth Circuits
have held that willfulness requires merely an intent to copy, not an intent to act
illegally); see also United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943); United
States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 540
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976).
319. See Napster License Agreement, at http://www.napster.com/terms (last visited
May 21, 2000) (“Napster respects copyright law and expects our users to do the same.
Unauthorized copying, distribution, modification, public display, or public
performance of copyrighted works is an infringement of the copyright holders’
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could be argued that licenses put users on constructive or actual
320
notice of applicable copyright law.
In copyright-related cases, even law enforcement officials may lack
the requisite knowledge of the law to be deemed “willful”
321
322
In United States v. Moran, the defendant, a former
infringers.
police officer, made duplicates of copyrighted video tapes for use in
his video rental store as a protection against vandalism of the
323
originals. In finding for the defendant, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nebraska noted that the relative naivete, lack of
“sophistication about business matters,” and misleading commentary
that the defendant had read about the legality of “insuring” by
324
making back-up copies, precluded a finding of willfulness.
Like Moran, most Napster users, or file-sharing buffs in general,
have little experience with the complexities of copyright law. Even
the college and post-graduate aged adults who constitute the majority
of file-sharing participants are not acquainted with copyright law at a
325
sophisticated level.
Also like Moran’s “insuring” of videotapes, there is division within
the media about whether “file-sharing” constitutes “fair use” or
326
whether it is infringing activity. Thus, the vast amount of press that
the Napster controversy generated also could be a factor in
327
determining whether infringement was truly willful. Statistics show

rights.”).
320. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
that “shrinkwrap” or “end-user” licenses were valid and binding contracts).
321. See United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (D. Neb. 1991) (holding
that the test for willful infringement is the subjective belief of the defendant).
322. 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
323. Id. at 1047.
324. Id. at 1051.
325.
I have complained more than once over the past few years that the copyright
law is complicated, arcane, and counterintuitive; and that the upshot of that
is that people don’t believe that the copyright law says what it does say.
People do seem to buy into copyright norms, but they don’t translate those
norms into the rules that the copyright statute does; they find it very hard to
believe that there’s really a law out there that says the stuff the copyright law
says.
Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237, 238-39
(1997).
326. Musicians and the public are split on the question of whether trading MP3s
constitutes “fair use.” Only the RIAA and executives at Napster and other file-trading
companies seem to have no doubts about the legality or illegality of the trading. See
Graff, supra note 75, at G5 (noting the rift among musicians concerning the legality
and desirability of MP3 trading); PC Data Online, Support for Free Digital Music Echoed
in PC Data Online Poll (July 27, 2000), at http://www.pcdataonline.com/
press/pcdo072700a.asp (noting that there is a lack of consensus among Americans
about the legality of MP3 downloading).
327. The Napster web site alone has collected hundreds of articles about the case,
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that most Americans are at least somewhat confused as to what
328
If participation is any indication of
constitutes an infringing use.
the public’s position on the legality of file-sharing, the recent
explosion of people engaged in file-sharing indicates an
329
overwhelming belief that it is or should be legal.
It would be
plausible for many infringers to claim that they did not, subjectively,
330
believe that they were in violation of the law.
4.

Constitutional constraints to enforcement: The Fourth Amendment
As discussed above, the difficulty in identifying infringers is one
factor that makes enforcing copyright laws against MP3 trading
331
Ironically, even if the anonymity of Freenet or
uniquely difficult.
Gnutella could be defeated technologically, the methods employed
to do so may prove unconstitutional.
The prosecution of online copyright infringers entails special
challenges for law enforcement officials, including locating and

published on the web by sources from ABC News to ZDNet.com, while an Internet
search using the HotBot.com search engine of the terms Napster in conjunction with
copyright yields over 600,000 hits.
328. See Kathryn Balint, Music Won’t Die When Napster Walks the Plank; Web Site
Ordered Halted, but Online Piracy Thrives, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 28, 2000, at A1
(noting that recent polls indicate widespread public support for Napster and belief
that trading MP3s is not infringement); PC Data Online, supra note 326 (citing poll
statistics that 50% of Americans believed obtaining free MP3s over the Internet is or
should be legal, while only 23% believed that it is illegal).
329. See Despite Legal Woes, Napster Use Grows, TIMES UNION, Oct. 18, 2000, at D6
(noting that the number of “unique users” (non-repeat users) on Napster soared by
345% from February to October 2000); see also Dick Kelsey, Poll: Potential Jurors in
Napster’s Corner (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/nb/
nb5.htm (noting that one survey found that over 41% of Americans above the age of
eighteen believe that downloading music from the Internet for free is not wrong if it
is for personal use).
330. See Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 UNIV.
DAYTON L. REV. 548, 577 (1997) (stating that copyright laws are not simple); Litman,
supra note 325, at 237 (noting that common beliefs about copyright often are not in
line with actual law). Almost in anticipation of this defense, the federal government
and copyright holders called for copyright awareness and education programs in
March 2000. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE
INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#FTC (noting initiatives by the FTC, FDA, and
SEC to raise awareness of Internet crime issues, including copyright violations);
Soundbyting, at http://www.soundbyting.com (last visited Aug. 20, 2000) (detailing
the RIAA’s “Soundbyting Campaign” to raise awareness of copyright law). Were
these programs to be implemented, they might undermine an ignorantia juris or lack
of willfulness defense. If basic copyright law became common knowledge (as applied
to the facts of file sharing) the factual premise of the defense would be eliminated.
Regardless of whether such a program comes to fruition, it is doubtful that the
willfulness requirement alone will prevent successful prosecutions. Convincing a jury
ignorant of the copyright laws that the defendant was equally ignorant may not prove
difficult.
331. See supra Part II.C.1.
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seizing contraband material that exists only “on the net” for a brief
332
time, or on personal computers. Undoubtedly this would implicate
333
the Fourth Amendment
guarantee of citizens’ reasonable
334
expectation of privacy. When a valid expectation of privacy exists,
government officials must obtain a search warrant based on probable
335
cause to perform a search of that area or affect.
The Fourth
Amendment also requires that warrants be issued from neutral
336
magistrates and describe the place to be searched with sufficient
337
“particularity.”
If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy,
then the inspection is not prohibited and the evidence revealed can
338
If the inspection, however, occurs
be submitted to a tribunal.
without a warrant and the defendant has a reasonable expectation of
339
privacy, the evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule.
The
exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence in a criminal trial that

332. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/search_docs/sect4.htm (updated May
9, 1999) (comparing the ease of hardware searches with the difficult issues raised by
searching networked computers).
333.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
334. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that Fourth
Amendment protections are limited to that which a citizen “seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public”).
335. See id. at 357 (noting that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment” with few exceptions) (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 497-99 (1958)).
336. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (finding that a
warrant issued by a state Attorney General was invalid because of the Attorney
General’s role as a law enforcement official); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948) (stating probable cause should not to be determined “by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
337. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967) (“The need for particularity
and evidence of reliability in the showing required when judicial authorization of a
search is sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping”); United States v.
Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that a warrant’s limitation to “any
and all visual depictions, in any format or media, of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct” was not too vague).
338. See Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 711, 715 (2000) (explaining how the exclusionary rule works in practice and
arguing that it is constitutionally sound, because it “can be justified on separation of
powers principles”).
339. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-60 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule applies to Fourth Amendment violations by states); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388-98 (1914) (explaining the rationale of excluding
evidence resulting from tainted searches).
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was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the context
of criminal infringement cases, the question is whether file-traders
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy to the contents of their
hard drives and their Internet communications.
Congress, courts, and the media continue to debate the privacy of
341
Internet communications intensely. Rulings addressing the Fourth
342
Amendment protection of email and the FBI’s use of the email
343
“snooping” program Carnivore only raise more questions about the
level of privacy that can be reasonably expected in electronic
344
transactions.
The Tenth Circuit found, however, a reasonable
345
expectation of privacy for the contents of a computer hard drive.

340. See Lynch, supra note 338, at 714 (“Under [the exclusionary] rule, evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is ordinarily inadmissible against a
criminal defendant at trial.”).
341. See The Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 63-76 (2000) (statement of Robert
Corn-Revere, partner specializing in Internet and telecom law, Hogan & Hartson)
(noting that increasing reliance upon computers and Internet communications calls
for application of Fourth Amendment protections and standards to the Internet);
Richard S. Dunham, Who’s Worried about Online Privacy? Who Isn’t? (June 28, 2000), at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/june2000/nf00628c.
htm?scriptFramed (citing a poll that found only eight percent of Americans believed
their email to be “secure and private from snooping outsiders”); Internet Users Seek
Assurances Over Online Use of Personal Data, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2000, at A8 (noting
that surveys showed that fifty-four percent of Americans believed that “tracking” of
Internet users by advertisers was harmful); Chris Oakes, ACLU: Law Needs Carnivore
Fix
at
(July
12,
2000),
http://www.wirednews.com/news/politics/
0,1283,37470,00.html (noting the American Civil Liberty Union’s opposition to the
FBI’s e-wiretapping device, “Carnivore”); John Schwartz & Robert O’Harrow, Jr.,
Online Privacy Code Gets FTC’s Support, WASH. POST, July 28, 2000, at E3 (reporting that
the Federal Trade Commission lauded efforts to secure the privacy of online
consumers through the “Network Advertising Initiative”).
342. See United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding
that a government employee did not have a reasonable expectation to the privacy of
his email communications on his computer system at work); United States v.
Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (finding that a member of the United States
military had no reasonable expectation of privacy to email communications on a
computer owned by the federal government); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406
(C.A.A.F. 1996) (finding that the expectation of privacy is diminished when a person
uses email because it may be inadvertently read by an ISP employee or disclosed by
the recipient).
343. See John Schwartz, FBI Using Internet Wiretap System, WASH. POST, July 11, 2000,
at A1 (reporting that the new FBI email interception system, “Carnivore,” has created
controversy and fears about Fourth Amendment violations).
344. See generally Edward Fenno, Federal Internet Privacy Law, 12 S.C. LAW. 36, 38
(2001) (noting that “since many Internet privacy issues are still relatively new, the law
in the area is in a state of flux”); Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and
Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093,
1109 (1996) (arguing that the growing reliance on computers as “diary . . . date
book . . . [and] checkbook” necessitates finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
to the contents of computers in order to preserve fundamental liberties).
345. See United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring
officers to obtain warrants to search the contents of hard drives and further
requiring officers to “engage in the intermediate step of sorting various types of
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Though courts seem to concede that persons have a right to
346
privacy concerning the contents of hard drives generally, Fourth
Amendment precedent suggests that file-traders may not have the
347
same blanket expectation of privacy.
As the act of file-sharing
enables traders to search one another’s hard drives for material they
348
are interested in uploading, one could argue that file-traders “open
the box” by trading files, and that the users’ expectation of privacy is
349
nullified.
Legitimate Internet usage can, and increasingly will, entail the
350
transfer of large amounts of data, therefore determining whether
the content of file-trading activity is contraband will require more
than observing the “heavy traffic” that led investigators to Jeffrey
351
Levy.
Where it is technologically possible, the large quantity of
legal Internet traffic may mean agents will be forced to either
352
intercept file-trading traffic to determine content, or remotely

documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant”) (citing United
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999)).
346. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act contains criminal provisions that
indicate a strong legislative intent to safeguard the privacy of electronic data stored
in computers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Davis v.
Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting in the context of a search of
the defendant’s hard drive that the “‘Fourth Amendment requires that a search
warrant be seized with sufficient particularity’” (quoting Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d
402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir.
1993) (finding that the expectation to privacy in the contents of a hard drive is
subject to the society’s recognition of that expectation (citing Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990))). But see United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110
(D. Kan. 2000) (holding that a person has no privacy interest in Internet subscriber
information maintained by an ISP).
347. The Supreme Court held that “a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (finding that the use of a “pen register” device
to determine the telephone numbers called by the defendant was not a search).
348. See Borland, supra note 214 (noting the vulnerability of information on the
computers of Napster and Gnutella users).
349. Under the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, police are free to
make a search outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment when the search is
one that members of the public could make without the consent of the defendant.
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (finding that “one
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be
reporting to the police”); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958-60 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that by placing a call to another member of the public via a pager,
the defendant had assumed the risk that authorities would intercept the
information).
350. See Transatlantic Cable, supra note 300, at 110 (citing statistics that show
average American and French Internet users downloading activity has grown to
almost 200 Megabytes every month); Scott Rosenberg, The Napster Files (Feb. 4, 2000),
at http://www.salon.com/tech/ col/rose/2000/02/04/napster_swap/print.html
(stating that standard personal computer hard drives are estimated to hold 1,000
Gigabytes of data by 2005).
351. See McCollum, supra note 281, at A51.
352. “Packet-sniffer” network tools can at least determine the kind of file being
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353

search the hard drives of suspects. One possibility is that agents will
simply connect to file-traders in “undercover” operations disguised as
fellow file-traders and gain access to hard drives using Freenet or
354
Gnutella as a vehicle.
One might argue that private investigators could uncover evidence
of Internet piracy, avoiding constitutional constraints that are
355
imposed on government agents.
Government solicitation of this
behavior, however, would legally transform these private actors into
government agents, precluding any evidence gathered in violation of
356
Fourth Amendment protections. Though this point is arguable, it
is probably enough to note that a degree of private and government
cooperation in this area will, at the very least, lead to substantial
ethical and evidentiary problems.
The remaining difficulty, however, is determining whether users
357
are in fact be engaged in fair use.
Even if MP3 files containing
copyrighted works are found, there is no way for an investigator to

transmitted, such as those carrying the “.mp3” tag. More sophisticated interception
methods may be developed in the future. See Packet Sniffer, at
http://www.sinica.edu.tw/cc/course/unix-overview/ node26.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2001) (explaining the technical specifications of “packet sniffers”).
353. A hypothetical example might be as follows: suppose that Bob is a student at
Big State University. Bob uses both computers attached to the university’s system as
well as his own home computer which is connected to the Internet via a dial-up ISP
and a cable modem. Bob actively trades MP3 files using Freenet. Bob’s trades are
conservatively estimated at around $1,000 in value every month. Bob has heard of
some legal disputes about MP3 trading, but no one seems to agree whether it is legal
or not. Bob decides to “keep on truckin’.” First, just “finding” Bob’s illicit activity
presents problems. Agents probably do not know where to start looking, unless they
engage in a “sting” by luring Bob to trade files and are somehow able to defeat
Freenet’s anonymity protections to identify his computer. Unless Bob traded
enough material just with the agents’ computers, however, the agents still would not
know whether Bob’s trading surpassed the criminal threshold. University computer
system operators might notice large volumes of material passing through Bob’s
system, but as legitimate transfers of large quantities of data become more common,
it is doubtful whether the transfers would constitute adequate suspicion, or be
grounds for a search of Bob’s computer. Obtaining a warrant without the help of
information from the sting operation would be difficult in this scenario, and the
sting might raise the problem of defeating an entrapment defense.
354. See Healey, supra note 75 (noting that the developer of Zeropaid.com used
Gnutella to “sting” child pornography traders by posting files with suggestive names
and then publishing the Internet addresses of those who download them).
355. See Napster Draws Members from Lawsuit (May 23, 2000), at
http://www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1931171.html?tag=st.cn.sr.ne.1 (explaining
that Metallica was successful in identifying infringers in a private investigation
funded by the band).
356. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989)
(holding that a railway was a government actor where it administered drug tests
under government regulations that showed a “strong preference” for the tests);
United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that an airline
employee acted as government agent where he acted under expectation of D.E.A.
reward).
357. See discussion infra Part I.B.5.b.
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verify whether the target also owns an authorized copy of the work,
perhaps in a format like compact discs, which would make the MP3
file a legitimate fair use copy. Distribution of that copy would
358
constitute infringement, but gathering evidence of distribution
exceeding the criminal threshold might be difficult, and complicated
further still by the entrapment defense, discussed below.
5.

Entrapment
The most promising method currently available for discovering the
identity of criminal infringers may also provide targets with an
additional defense. By using the undercover methods described
359
above, and posing as file-traders offering works for trade in order to
gain access to infringers’ hard drives to discover contraband, police
360
may allow the infringers to raise the defense of entrapment.
To
succeed the defendant must show: (1) that the government agents
induced the commission of the crime, and (2) that the defendant was
361
not predisposed to commit the crime.
In a file-trading “sting” it would be impossible for defendants to
claim that the government induced them to engage in file-trading,
since one would already have to be engaged in active trading to
become a target. Defendants, however, need only prove that they
were induced to upload or download works with an aggregate value
362
that exceeds the criminal threshold.
Inducement will be found if

358. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994) (granting copyright owners the right of
distribution); id. § 501 (making a violation of the distribution right, inter alia,
actionable as infringement).
359. See also Jennifer Gregg, Note, Caught in the Web: Entrapment in Cyberspace, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 157, 186-93 (1996) (discussing the law of entrapment
and its application in Internet crime cases, especially those involving child
pornography).
360. See generally Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 409 (1999) (reviewing entrapment jurisprudence and arguing that
the “predisposition” element is a “fictional entity,” and that, since it does not exist
either no one is predisposed to commit the crime, or “everyone . . . is predisposed to
commit the crime”).
361. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (holding that the
burden is upon the government to show predisposition but declining to define a
bright line test); United States v. Dunn, 779 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“Furthermore, in order to reach the central issue of predisposition, we have held
that there need only be some evidence of government initiation of the illegal
conduct.” (citing United States v. Martinez-Carcano, 557 F.2d 966, 969-70 (2d Cir.
1977))). A defendant either has the burden of production or must prove
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, depending upon the jurisdiction.
See United States v. Damblu, 134 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Entrapment is a
defense for which the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence.”); State v. Smith, 677 P.2d 100, 103 (Wash. 1984) (noting that the
defendant has the burden of production in raising a defense of entrapment).
362. The defense must make the distinction that the defendant engaged in
conduct that, while similar, was not criminal, and that it was the government that
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government agents conducting the sting initiated the illegal conduct,
363
regardless of whether “pressure tactics” are used.
Proving that the predisposition element is in their favor may be
more difficult for the defense. Prosecutors can argue that the fact
that the defendants engaged in file-trading, though not dispositive, is
strong evidence of a willingness to act criminally. In cases where
there is evidence of some infringing activity before government
involvement, prosecutors will have a strong argument that the
government only provided an opportunity for the defendants to act
on their criminal inclinations, in which case entrapment is not a
364
defense.
If defendants, however, can show that their file-sharing
tendencies were not criminal tendencies until the government
produced a fatal temptation, entrapment may provide a complete
365
defense.
6.

Jurisdiction
American courts have responded with flexibility when faced with
366
determining jurisdiction for acts that take place in cyberspace.
Finding jurisdiction over Internet crimes is not difficult when the
367
But the threat to
culprits are to be found on American soil.

initiated or solicited the criminal actions. See United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 6770 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining the entrapment defense).
363. See Dunn, 779 F.2d at 158 (“In this circuit, ‘soliciting, proposing, initiating,
broaching or suggesting the commission of the offence charged’ does constitute
inducement.” (citing United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952)));
United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that inducement
does not depend on “the degree of pressure exerted”).
364. See Martinez-Carcano, 557 F.2d at 970 (“[T]he Government has to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the
crime.” (quoting United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1971))).
365. See Catherine Shultz, Note, Victim or the Crime?: The Government’s Burden in
Proving Predisposition in Federal Entrapment Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 949, 966 (1999)
(noting that current entrapment jurisprudence places the burden of proof on the
prosecution to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt and precludes “the defendant’s ready response to the
government solicitations cannot be enough to establish that he was predisposed to
commit the crime”).
366. See Kevin J. Smith, Internet Taxes: Congressional Efforts to Control States’ Ability to
Tax the World Wide Web, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 62-64 (2000), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i1/article3.html (collecting cases and noting that
courts have developed a rough test for finding personal jurisdiction in Internet cases,
recognizing that the simple ability to view a website is not enough to support
jurisdiction, and inquiring whether the Internet activity was passive and whether it
was directed in any particular way at the forum state); see also Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding jurisdiction
over a company due, in great part, to its use of the Internet to solicit business in the
forum state).
367. So long as the defendant’s actions are directed towards a particular forum,
such that he reasonably may expect to haled into court there, a court is likely to find
jurisdiction. See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165; Clyde H. Wilson, Jr. & M. Susan
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copyright is not limited to the boundaries of the United States.
The global nature of the Internet promises to make enforcement
369
of copyright law even more challenging.
Some e-commerce
entrepreneurs have recently taken the step of placing their systems
on a World War II era anti-aircraft platform in the North Sea in an
effort to avoid the complications imposed by falling within the
370
jurisdiction of any sovereign nation.
Hunting down copyright
bandits from Belize to Tanzania, not to mention the open seas, might
be a challenge too great even for the long-arm of American law. A
full analysis of the jurisdictional problems posed by the international
nature of the Internet is beyond the scope of this Comment.
CONCLUSION
Increased pressure by copyright holders and content industry
associations may bring about more prosecutions of FTS users for
criminal infringement of musical recordings and other protected
works. The current legal regime criminalized a very common
behavior. Prosecuting these crimes will not be without significant
hurdles. Chief among those constraints will be questions about the
constitutionality of evidence-gathering techniques on the Internet
and computer users’ reasonable expectations of privacy. Congress,
the courts, and society must decide what price we are willing to pay to
protect the rights of intellectual property producers and owners, and
whether sacrificing a significant amount of privacy for this objective is
worth the cost. Yet, even deciding to forego some privacy may not be
enough to allow for successful prosecutions and stem the tide of
copyright infringement. The Internet’s global nature and the lack of
international consensus on the contours of legitimate intellectual
property right promises many criminal infringers shelter beyond our
borders.
Whatever the outcome of the legal debate, the progress of

Wilson, Cyberspace Litigation: Chasing the Information Highway Bandits, TRIAL, Oct.
2000, at 48 (“The key seems to be the degree of interactivity. A site permitting
individual purchases, without more, is probably inadequate to confer personal
jurisdiction, but a site soliciting a subscription relationship with customers for a
continued supply of information is probably adequate to confer jurisdiction.”).
368. See generally Symposium, Panel III: Intellectual Property Issues in E-Commerce—
Piracy in the Internet Age, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131 (2000) (noting that piracy is
a rampant problem and that the international nature of the Internet only heightens
intellectual property law enforcement problems).
369. See Simson Garfinkel, Welcome to Sealand. Now Bugger Off., WIRED, July 1, 2000,
at 230 (reporting that some Internet entrepreneurs have purchased an aging antiaircraft deck in the North Sea, which they intend to turn into an extra-territorial
oasis for Internet rebels called “Sealand”).
370. Id.
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technology will probably ensure that copyright infringement will
continue to plague content industries while remaining a source of
entertainment for technophiles. Technology, rather than innovative
use of existing laws, will probably prove to be the key, if there is any,
to protecting intellectual property. If investigators are able to find a
way to discover “illicit” copies without the currently necessary
intrusion into the inner sanctums of private information stored on
our computers, copyright owners will be able to sleep a little better.
In the end, permanently preventing the development of anonymityprotecting file-sharing software will probably be impossible. As one
dot-com CEO has noted, “[t]he only way to stop [Gnutella] is to turn
371
off the Internet.”


371. Franklin Paul, Internet Music Debate Moves to Washington (May 24, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/05/24/mp3.napster.suit/index.html.

